The sending of the Panther to Agadir was not a prudent act.  It imported either too much or too little.  It is said to have been the plan of Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, at that time the Foreign Secretary and generally a sensible statesman, and to have been done in spite of misgivings expressed by the Emperor about its danger.  The circumstances of the moment were such that one can not but feel a certain sympathy with the German perturbation at the time.  The march of the French Army to Fez had come on them suddenly, and it at least suggested a development of French claims going beyond what Germany had agreed to at the Algeciras Conference nearly six years previously.  Those who wish to inform themselves about the commotion the expedition of the French stirred up in Germany, and of the efforts the Emperor and Bethmann Hollweg had to make to restrain it, will do well to read the latter’s account of what happened there in the second chapter of his recent book.  But to think that the sending of a German warship could make things better was to repeat the error of judgment which had characterized “the ally in shining armor” speech of the German Emperor to Austria when she formally annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina three years before.  Instead of using diplomatic methods something that looked like a threat was allowed to appear, and the answer was Mr. Lloyd George’s well-known declaration of July 21, 1911, in the City of London.  The sending of the Panther, if intelligible, was certainly unfortunate.

In the winter, after the actual crisis had been got over, there was evidence of continuing ill-feeling in Germany, and the suspicion in London did not diminish.  In January, 1912, an informal message was given by the Emperor to Sir Ernest Cassel for transmission through one of my colleagues to the Foreign Office.[2] I knew nothing of this at the time, but learned shortly afterward that it was to the effect that the Emperor was concerned at the state of feeling that had arisen in both countries, and thought that the most hopeful method of improving matters would be that the Cabinet of St. James’s should exchange views directly with the Cabinet of Berlin.  For this course there was a good deal to be said.  The peace had indeed been preserved, but, as Herr von Bethmann Hollweg told me later on, not without effort.  The attitude of Germany toward France had seemed ominous.  The British Government had done all it could to avert a breach, but its sympathy was opposed to language used in Germany, the spirit of which seemed to us to have in it an aggressive element.  We did not hesitate to say what we thought about this.

Even after the Agadir incident was quite closed, the tension between Germany and England had not passed away.  The military party in the former country began to talk of a “preventive” war pretty loudly.  Even so moderate an organ in Berlin as the Post wrote of German opinion that “we all know that blood is assuredly about to be shed, and the longer we wait the more there will be.  Few, however, have the courage to imitate Frederick the Great, and not one dares the deed.”