Some weeks afterward difficulties were raised from Berlin.  Germany said that she was ready to discuss with the British Government the question of the terminal portion of the railway, but she did not desire to bring the other two Powers into that discussion, because the conference would probably fail and accentuate the differences between her and the other Powers.

The matter thus came to an end.  It was, I think, a great pity, because I have reason to believe that the French view was that, if the Bagdad Railway question could have been settled, one great obstacle in the way of reconciling German with French and English interests would have disappeared.  I came to the conclusion afterward that it was probably owing to the views of Prince von Buelow that the proposal had come to an untimely end.  Whether he did not wish for an expanded entente; whether the feeling was strong in Germany that the Bagdad Railway had become a specially German concern and should not be shared; or what other reason he may have had, I do not know; but it was from Berlin, after the Emperor’s return there at the end of November, 1907, that the negotiations were finally blocked.

Altho these negotiations had no definite result, they assisted in promoting increasing frankness between the two Foreign Offices, and other things went with more smoothness.  Sir Edward Grey kept France and Russia informed of all we did, and he was also very open with the Germans.  Until well on in 1911 all went satisfactorily.  In the early part of that year the Emperor came to London to visit the present King, who had by that time succeeded to the throne.  I had ventured to propose to the King that during the Emperor’s visit I should, as War Minister, give a luncheon to the generals who were on his staff.  But when the Emperor heard of this he sent a message that he would like to come and lunch with me himself, and to meet people whom otherwise he might not see.

I acted on my own discretion, and when he came to luncheon at my house in Queen Anne’s Gate there was a somewhat widely selected party of about a dozen to meet him.  For it included not only Lord Morley, Lord Kitchener, and Lord Curzon, whom he was sure to meet elsewhere, but Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, who was then leading the Labor Party, Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, our great naval commander, Lord Moulton, Mr. Edmund Gosse, Mr. Sargent, Mr. Spender, the editor of the Westminster Gazette, and others representing various types of British opinion.  The Emperor engaged in conversation with everyone, and all went with smoothness.

He had a great reception in London.  But enthusiasm about him was somewhat damped when, in July, 1911, not long after his return to Germany, he sent the afterwards famous warship Panther to Agadir.  The French were naturally alarmed, and the situation which had become so promising was overcast.  Our naval arrangements and our new military organization were ready, and our mobilization plans were fairly complete, as the German General Staff knew from their military attache.  But the point was, how to avoid an outbreak, and to get rid of the feeling and friction to which the Agadir crisis was giving rise.  Our growing good relations were temporarily clouded.