“What is Spain doing over here, anyhow?” was the imperious inquiry of Congress.  A sufficient number of Republicans had agreed to vote with the Democrats in Congress for war.  A whirlwind of passion swept over the House, intensified, no doubt, by the unfortunate explosion of the warship Maine in Havana Harbor, supposed by some to be Spanish work.  The supposition gave Spain far too much credit for skill and activity.

War was declared—­the Senate being shocked by Senator Proctor’s statement of the concentration camps he had seen in Cuba.  The country responded to the cry, “What is Spain doing over here anyhow?” President McKinley and his peace policy were left high and dry, and nothing remained for him but to go with the country.  The Government then announced that war was not undertaken for territorial aggrandizement, and Cuba was promised independence—­a promise faithfully kept.  We should not fail to remember this, for it is the one cheering feature of the war.

The possession of the Philippines left a stain.  They were not only territorial acquisition; they were dragged from reluctant Spain and twenty million dollars paid for them.  The Filipinos had been our allies in fighting Spain.  The Cabinet, under the lead of the President, had agreed that only a coaling station in the Philippines should be asked for, and it is said such were the instructions given by cable at first to the Peace Commissioners at Paris.  President McKinley then made a tour through the West and, of course, was cheered when he spoke of the flag and Dewey’s victory.  He returned, impressed with the idea that withdrawal would be unpopular, and reversed his former policy.  I was told by one of his Cabinet that every member was opposed to the reversal.  A senator told me Judge Day, one of the Peace Commissioners, wrote a remonstrance from Paris, which if ever published, would rank next to Washington’s Farewell Address, so fine was it.

At this stage an important member of the Cabinet, my friend Cornelius N. Bliss, called and asked me to visit Washington and see the President on the subject.  He said: 

“You have influence with him.  None of us have been able to move him since he returned from the West.”

I went to Washington and had an interview with him.  But he was obdurate.  Withdrawal would create a revolution at home, he said.  Finally, by persuading his secretaries that he had to bend to the blast, and always holding that it would be only a temporary occupation and that a way out would be found, the Cabinet yielded.

He sent for President Schurman, of Cornell University, who had opposed annexation and made him chairman of the committee to visit the Filipinos; and later for Judge Taft, who had been prominent against such a violation of American policy, to go as Governor.  When the Judge stated that it seemed strange to send for one, who had publicly denounced annexation, the President said that was the very reason why he wished him for the place.  This was all very well, but to refrain from annexing and to relinquish territory once purchased are different propositions.  This was soon seen.