On the 25th, Lord Bridport attempted to sail.  The enemy had arrived four days before, and if the weather had allowed the troops to land, the most complete naval victory would have been too late to save the country.  The fleet was prevented from putting to sea on that day by a succession of accidents, by which five of the heaviest ships were disabled before they could leave the harbour.  The Prime missed stays, and fell on board the Sans Pareil.  The Formidable ran foul of the Ville de Paris; and the Atlas grounded.  Four of these were three-deckers, and the other was one of the finest 80-gun ships in the service.  When at length part of the fleet reached St. Helen’s, a shift of wind kept the rest at Spithead; and the Admiral could not put to sea till January 3rd.  The baffled enemy was then returning, and seven of his ships had actually arrived in Brest two days before the British sailed from Portsmouth to pursue them.

How Sir J. Colpoys missed the enemy may appear extraordinary.  The explanation, which every circumstance tends to confirm, is, that he was restrained from attacking them by his instructions, his force being intended only for a squadron of observation:  for though the enemy’s fleet, as it actually sailed, would have given him an easy victory, there was always reason to believe that it was much too strong for his force.  Exclusive of the five sail which were hourly expected from Toulon, there were twenty-four line-of-battle ships in Brest, and there was no reason to conclude but that the greater part, if not the whole of them, were to sail with the expedition.  As the British would be so much outnumbered, Sir E. Pellew offered, in the event of a battle, to take a place in the line with the Indefatigable.  The Admiral thanked him, but declined the offer, believing that the enemy’s superiority was too great to hope for victory.  When the enemy put to sea, the British fleet was eight or nine leagues to the westward of their usual cruising ground, and thus was missed, not only by the Indefatigable, but also by the Revolutionaire, which did not join with the information till the 19th.  Next day, the Toulon ships were seen, and chased into port; and the Admiral, having no means of learning the course of the Brest fleet, and some of his own ships being obliged to part company, in consequence of injuries they had sustained in a gale, bore away with the remainder for Spithead.

Meantime, almost everything favoured the enemy.  The two divisions of his fleet, which were separated on the evening of the 16th, by putting to sea through different passages, rejoined on the 19th, and reached their destination early on the 21st, without having met a single British cruiser.  When they appeared off the Bay, a number of pilot-boats came out, supposing them to be a British fleet; and thus the French Admiral obtained pilots for his ships, and gained all the information he wanted of the British men-of-war on the coast.  A line-of-battle ship and three frigates were still missing.  Their absence would not have materially weakened the enemy, whose force still exceeded what the rebel delegates had required; but the two commanders had embarked in one of the missing frigates, the Fraternite; and Rear-Admiral Bouvet and General Grouchy, the seconds in command, could scarcely act with decision while their chiefs were hourly expected.