Reply Obj. 1:  Augustine speaks there of perfect enjoyment.

Reply Obj. 2:  The will is hindered in two ways from being at rest.  First on the part of the object; by reason of its not being the last end, but ordained to something else:  secondly on the part of the one who desires the end, by reason of his not being yet in possession of it.  Now it is the object that specifies an act:  but on the agent depends the manner of acting, so that the act be perfect or imperfect, as compared with the actual circumstances of the agent.  Therefore enjoyment of anything but the last end is not enjoyment properly speaking, as falling short of the nature of enjoyment.  But enjoyment of the last end, not yet possessed, is enjoyment properly speaking, but imperfect, on account of the imperfect way in which it is possessed.

Reply Obj. 3:  One is said to lay hold of or to have an end, not only in reality, but also in intention, as stated above. ________________________

QUESTION 12

OF INTENTION
(In Five Articles)

We must now consider Intention:  concerning which there are five points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether intention is an act of intellect or of the will?

(2) Whether it is only of the last end?

(3) Whether one can intend two things at the same time?

(4) Whether intention of the end is the same act as volition of the means?

(5) Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 12, Art. 1]

Whether Intention Is an Act of the Intellect or of the Will?

Objection 1:  It would seem that intention is an act of the intellect, and not of the will.  For it is written (Matt. 6:22):  “If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be lightsome”:  where, according to Augustine (De Serm.  Dom. in Monte ii, 13) the eye signifies intention.  But since the eye is the organ of sight, it signifies the apprehensive power.  Therefore intention is not an act of the appetitive but of the apprehensive power.

Obj. 2:  Further, Augustine says (De Serm.  Dom. in Monte ii, 13) that Our Lord spoke of intention as a light, when He said (Matt. 6:23):  “If the light that is in thee be darkness,” etc.  But light pertains to knowledge.  Therefore intention does too.

Obj. 3:  Further, intention implies a kind of ordaining to an end.  But to ordain is an act of reason.  Therefore intention belongs not to the will but to the reason.

Obj. 4:  Further, an act of the will is either of the end or of the means.  But the act of the will in respect of the end is called volition, or enjoyment; with regard to the means, it is choice, from which intention is distinct.  Therefore it is not an act of the will.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 4, 8, 9) that “the intention of the will unites the sight to the object seen; and the images retained in the memory, to the penetrating gaze of the soul’s inner thought.”  Therefore intention is an act of the will.