Reply Obj. 2:  Fruit bears one relation to the tree that bore it, and another to man that enjoys it.  To the tree indeed that bore it, it is compared as effect to cause; to the one enjoying it, as the final object of his longing and the consummation of his delight.  Accordingly these fruits mentioned by the Apostle are so called because they are certain effects of the Holy Ghost in us, wherefore they are called “fruits of the spirit”:  but not as though we are to enjoy them as our last end.  Or we may say with Ambrose that they are called fruits because “we should desire them for their own sake”:  not indeed as though they were not ordained to the last end; but because they are such that we ought to find pleasure in them.

Reply Obj. 3:  As stated above (Q. 1, A. 8; Q. 2, A. 7), we speak of an end in a twofold sense:  first, as being the thing itself; secondly, as the attainment thereof.  These are not, of course, two ends, but one end, considered in itself, and in its relation to something else.  Accordingly God is the last end, as that which is ultimately sought for:  while the enjoyment is as the attainment of this last end.  And so, just as God is not one end, and the enjoyment of God, another:  so it is the same enjoyment whereby we enjoy God, and whereby we enjoy our enjoyment of God.  And the same applies to created happiness which consists in enjoyment. ________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 11, Art. 4]

Whether Enjoyment Is Only of the End Possessed?

Objection 1:  It would seem that enjoyment is only of the end possessed.  For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1) that “to enjoy is to use joyfully, with the joy, not of hope, but of possession.”  But so long as a thing is not had, there is joy, not of possession, but of hope.  Therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed.

Obj. 2:  Further, as stated above (A. 3), enjoyment is not properly otherwise than of the last end:  because this alone gives rest to the appetite.  But the appetite has no rest save in the possession of the end.  Therefore enjoyment, properly speaking, is only of the end possessed.

Obj. 3:  Further, to enjoy is to lay hold of the fruit.  But one does not lay hold of the fruit until one is in possession of the end.  Therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed.

On the contrary, “to enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own sake,” as Augustine says (De Doctr.  Christ. i, 4).  But this is possible, even in regard to a thing which is not in our possession.  Therefore it is possible to enjoy the end even though it be not possessed.

I answer that, To enjoy implies a certain relation of the will to the last end, according as the will has something by way of last end.  Now an end is possessed in two ways; perfectly and imperfectly.  Perfectly, when it is possessed not only in intention but also in reality; imperfectly, when it is possessed in intention only.  Perfect enjoyment, therefore, is of the end already possessed:  but imperfect enjoyment is also of the end possessed not really, but only in intention.