Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 1,748 pages of information about Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae).

Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 1,748 pages of information about Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae).

Reply Obj. 1:  Charity, inasmuch as it has the last end for object, moves the other virtues to act.  For the habit to which the end pertains always commands the habits to which the means pertain, as was said above (Q. 9, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 2:  A work can be toilsome and difficult in two ways:  first, from the greatness of the work, and thus the greatness of the work pertains to the increase of merit; and thus charity does not lessen the toil—­rather, it makes us undertake the greatest toils, “for it does great things, if it exists,” as Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxx).  Secondly, from the defect of the operator; for what is not done with a ready will is hard and difficult to all of us, and this toil lessens merit and is removed by charity.

Reply Obj. 3:  The act of faith is not meritorious unless “faith . . . worketh by charity” (Gal. 5:6).  So, too, the acts of patience and fortitude are not meritorious unless a man does them out of charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:3:  “If I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.” ________________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 5]

Whether a Man May Merit for Himself the First Grace?

Objection 1:  It would seem that a man may merit for himself the first grace, because, as Augustine says (Ep. clxxxvi), “faith merits justification.”  Now a man is justified by the first grace.  Therefore a man may merit the first grace.

Obj. 2:  Further, God gives grace only to the worthy.  Now, no one is said to be worthy of some good, unless he has merited it condignly.  Therefore we may merit the first grace condignly.

Obj. 3:  Further, with men we may merit a gift already received.  Thus if a man receives a horse from his master, he merits it by a good use of it in his master’s service.  Now God is much more bountiful than man.  Much more, therefore, may a man, by subsequent works, merit the first grace already received from God.

On the contrary, The nature of grace is repugnant to reward of works, according to Rom. 4:4:  “Now to him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace but according to debt.”  Now a man merits what is reckoned to him according to debt, as the reward of his works.  Hence a man may not merit the first grace.

I answer that, The gift of grace may be considered in two ways:  first in the nature of a gratuitous gift, and thus it is manifest that all merit is repugnant to grace, since as the Apostle says (Rom. 11:6), “if by grace, it is not now by works.”  Secondly, it may be considered as regards the nature of the thing given, and thus, also, it cannot come under the merit of him who has not grace, both because it exceeds the proportion of nature, and because previous to grace a man in the state of sin has an obstacle to his meriting grace, viz. sin.  But when anyone has grace, the grace already possessed cannot come under merit, since reward is the term of the work, but grace is the principle of all our good works, as stated above (Q. 109).  But of anyone merits a further gratuitous gift by virtue of the preceding grace, it would not be the first grace.  Hence it is manifest that no one can merit for himself the first grace.

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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.