On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 15:14):  “God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel.”  Therefore He does not of necessity move man’s will.

I answer that, As Dionysius says (Div.  Nom. iv) “it belongs to Divine providence, not to destroy but to preserve the nature of things.”  Wherefore it moves all things in accordance with their conditions; so that from necessary causes through the Divine motion, effects follow of necessity; but from contingent causes, effects follow contingently.  Since, therefore, the will is an active principle, not determinate to one thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things, God so moves it, that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its movement remains contingent and not necessary, except in those things to which it is moved naturally.

Reply Obj. 1:  The Divine will extends not only to the doing of something by the thing which He moves, but also to its being done in a way which is fitting to the nature of that thing.  And therefore it would be more repugnant to the Divine motion, for the will to be moved of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature; than for it to be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature.

Reply Obj. 2:  That is natural to a thing, which God so works in it that it may be natural to it:  for thus is something becoming to a thing, according as God wishes it to be becoming.  Now He does not wish that whatever He works in things should be natural to them, for instance, that the dead should rise again.  But this He does wish to be natural to each thing—­that it be subject to the Divine power.

Reply Obj. 3:  If God moves the will to anything, it is incompatible with this supposition, that the will be not moved thereto.  But it is not impossible simply.  Consequently it does not follow that the will is moved by God necessarily. ________________________

QUESTION 11

OF ENJOYMENT [Or, Fruition], WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL (In Four Articles)

We must now consider enjoyment:  concerning which there are four points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power?

(2) Whether it belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to irrational animals?

(3) Whether enjoyment is only of the last end?

(4) Whether it is only of the end possessed?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 11, Art. 1]

Whether to Enjoy Is an Act of the Appetitive Power?

Objection 1:  It would seem that to enjoy belongs not only to the appetitive power.  For to enjoy seems nothing else than to receive the fruit.  But it is the intellect, in whose act Happiness consists, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 4), that receives the fruit of human life, which is Happiness.  Therefore to enjoy is not an act of the appetitive power, but of the intellect.