Sometimes, however, the reason is not entirely engrossed by the passion, so that the judgment of reason retains, to a certain extent, its freedom:  and thus the movement of the will remains in a certain degree.  Accordingly in so far as the reason remains free, and not subject to the passion, the will’s movement, which also remains, does not tend of necessity to that whereto the passion inclines it.  Consequently, either there is no movement of the will in that man, and the passion alone holds its sway:  or if there be a movement of the will, it does not necessarily follow the passion.

Reply Obj. 1:  Although the will cannot prevent the movement of concupiscence from arising, of which the Apostle says:  “The evil which I will not, that I do—­i.e.  I desire”; yet it is in the power of the will not to will to desire or not to consent to concupiscence.  And thus it does not necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence.

Reply Obj. 2:  Since there is in man a twofold nature, intellectual and sensitive; sometimes man is such and such uniformly in respect of his whole soul:  either because the sensitive part is wholly subject to his reason, as in the virtuous; or because reason is entirely engrossed by passion, as in a madman.  But sometimes, although reason is clouded by passion, yet something of this reason remains free.  And in respect of this, man can either repel the passion entirely, or at least hold himself in check so as not to be led away by the passion.  For when thus disposed, since man is variously disposed according to the various parts of the soul, a thing appears to him otherwise according to his reason, than it does according to a passion.

Reply Obj. 3:  The will is moved not only by the universal good apprehended by the reason, but also by good apprehended by sense.  Wherefore he can be moved to some particular good independently of a passion of the sensitive appetite.  For we will and do many things without passion, and through choice alone; as is most evident in those cases wherein reason resists passion. ________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 10, Art. 4]

Whether the Will Is Moved of Necessity by the Exterior Mover Which Is
God?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by God.  For every agent that cannot be resisted moves of necessity.  But God cannot be resisted, because His power is infinite; wherefore it is written (Rom. 9:19):  “Who resisteth His will?” Therefore God moves the will of necessity.

Obj. 2:  Further, the will is moved of necessity to whatever it wills naturally, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3).  But “whatever God does in a thing is natural to it,” as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3).  Therefore the will wills of necessity everything to which God moves it.

Obj. 3:  Further, a thing is possible, if nothing impossible follows from its being supposed.  But something impossible follows from the supposition that the will does not will that to which God moves it:  because in that case God’s operation would be ineffectual.  Therefore it is not possible for the will not to will that to which God moves it.  Therefore it wills it of necessity.