THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 110, Art. 3]

Whether Grace Is the Same As Virtue?

Objection 1:  It would seem that grace is the same as virtue.  For Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xiv) that “operating grace is faith that worketh by charity.”  But faith that worketh by charity is a virtue.  Therefore grace is a virtue.

Obj. 2:  Further, what fits the definition, fits the defined.  But the definitions of virtue given by saints and philosophers fit grace, since “it makes its subject good, and his work good,” and “it is a good quality of the mind, whereby we live righteously,” etc.  Therefore grace is virtue.

Obj. 3:  Further, grace is a quality.  Now it is clearly not in the fourth species of quality; viz. form which is the “abiding figure of things,” since it does not belong to bodies.  Nor is it in the third, since it is not a “passion nor a passion-like quality,” which is in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in Physic. viii; and grace is principally in the mind.  Nor is it in the second species, which is “natural power” or “impotence”; since grace is above nature and does not regard good and evil, as does natural power.  Therefore it must be in the first species which is “habit” or “disposition.”  Now habits of the mind are virtues; since even knowledge itself is a virtue after a manner, as stated above (Q. 57, AA. 1, 2).  Therefore grace is the same as virtue.

On the contrary, If grace is a virtue, it would seem before all to be one of the three theological virtues.  But grace is neither faith nor hope, for these can be without sanctifying grace.  Nor is it charity, since “grace foreruns charity,” as Augustine says in his book on the Predestination of the Saints (De Dono Persev. xvi).  Therefore grace is not virtue.

I answer that, Some held that grace and virtue were identical in essence, and differed only logically—­in the sense that we speak of grace inasmuch as it makes man pleasing to God, or is given gratuitously—­and of virtue inasmuch as it empowers us to act rightly.  And the Master seems to have thought this (Sent. ii, D 27).

But if anyone rightly considers the nature of virtue, this cannot hold, since, as the Philosopher says (Physic. vii, text. 17), “virtue is disposition of what is perfect—­and I call perfect what is disposed according to its nature.”  Now from this it is clear that the virtue of a thing has reference to some pre-existing nature, from the fact that everything is disposed with reference to what befits its nature.  But it is manifest that the virtues acquired by human acts of which we spoke above (Q. 55, seqq.) are dispositions, whereby a man is fittingly disposed with reference to the nature whereby he is a man; whereas infused virtues dispose man in a higher manner and towards a higher end, and consequently in relation to some higher nature, i.e. in relation to a participation of the Divine Nature, according to 2 Pet. 1:4:  “He hath given us most great and most precious promises; that by these you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature.”  And it is in respect of receiving this nature that we are said to be born again sons of God.