Obj. 2:  Further, as the soul quickens the body so does God quicken the soul; hence it is written (Deut. 30:20):  “He is thy life.”  Now the soul quickens the body immediately.  Therefore nothing can come as a medium between God and the soul.  Hence grace implies nothing created in the soul.

Obj. 3:  Further, on Rom. 1:7, “Grace to you and peace,” the gloss says:  “Grace, i.e. the remission of sins.”  Now the remission of sin implies nothing in the soul, but only in God, Who does not impute the sin, according to Ps. 31:2:  “Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin.”  Hence neither does grace imply anything in the soul.

On the contrary, Light implies something in what is enlightened.  But grace is a light of the soul; hence Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia xxii):  “The light of truth rightly deserts the prevaricator of the law, and those who have been thus deserted become blind.”  Therefore grace implies something in the soul.

I answer that, According to the common manner of speech, grace is usually taken in three ways.  First, for anyone’s love, as we are accustomed to say that the soldier is in the good graces of the king, i.e. the king looks on him with favor.  Secondly, it is taken for any gift freely bestowed, as we are accustomed to say:  I do you this act of grace.  Thirdly, it is taken for the recompense of a gift given “gratis,” inasmuch as we are said to be “grateful” for benefits.  Of these three the second depends on the first, since one bestows something on another “gratis” from the love wherewith he receives him into his good “graces.”  And from the second proceeds the third, since from benefits bestowed “gratis” arises “gratitude.”

Now as regards the last two, it is clear that grace implies something in him who receives grace:  first, the gift given gratis; secondly, the acknowledgment of the gift.  But as regards the first, a difference must be noted between the grace of God and the grace of man; for since the creature’s good springs from the Divine will, some good in the creature flows from God’s love, whereby He wishes the good of the creature.  On the other hand, the will of man is moved by the good pre-existing in things; and hence man’s love does not wholly cause the good of the thing, but pre-supposes it either in part or wholly.  Therefore it is clear that every love of God is followed at some time by a good caused in the creature, but not co-eternal with the eternal love.  And according to this difference of good the love of God to the creature is looked at differently.  For one is common, whereby He loves “all things that are” (Wis. 11:25), and thereby gives things their natural being.  But the second is a special love, whereby He draws the rational creature above the condition of its nature to a participation of the Divine good; and according to this love He is said to love anyone simply, since it is by this love that God simply wishes the eternal good, which is Himself, for the creature.