QUESTION 10

OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WILL IS MOVED
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the manner in which the will is moved.  Under this head there are four points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?

(2) Whether it is moved of necessity by its object?

(3) Whether it is moved of necessity by the lower appetite?

(4) Whether it is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God? ________________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 10, Art. 1]

Whether the Will Is Moved to Anything Naturally?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the will is not moved to anything naturally.  For the natural agent is condivided with the voluntary agent, as stated at the beginning of Phys. ii, 1.  Therefore the will is not moved to anything naturally.

Obj. 2:  Further, that which is natural is in a thing always:  as “being hot” is in fire.  But no movement is always in the will.  Therefore no movement is natural to the will.

Obj. 3:  Further, nature is determinate to one thing:  whereas the will is referred to opposites.  Therefore the will wills nothing naturally.

On the contrary, The movement of the will follows the movement of the intellect.  But the intellect understands some things naturally.  Therefore the will, too, wills some things naturally.

I answer that, As Boethius says (De Duabus Nat.) and the Philosopher also (Metaph. v, 4) the word “nature” is used in a manifold sense.  For sometimes it stands for the intrinsic principle in movable things.  In this sense nature is either matter or the material form, as stated in Phys. ii, 1.  In another sense nature stands for any substance, or even for any being.  And in this sense, that is said to be natural to a thing which befits it in respect of its substance.  And this is that which of itself is in a thing.  Now all things that do not of themselves belong to the thing in which they are, are reduced to something which belongs of itself to that thing, as to their principle.  Wherefore, taking nature in this sense, it is necessary that the principle of whatever belongs to a thing, be a natural principle.  This is evident in regard to the intellect:  for the principles of intellectual knowledge are naturally known.  In like manner the principle of voluntary movements must be something naturally willed.

Now this is good in general, to which the will tends naturally, as does each power to its object; and again it is the last end, which stands in the same relation to things appetible, as the first principles of demonstrations to things intelligible:  and, speaking generally, it is all those things which belong to the willer according to his nature.  For it is not only things pertaining to the will that the will desires, but also that which pertains to each power, and to the entire man.  Wherefore man wills naturally not only the object of the will, but also other things that are appropriate to the other powers; such as the knowledge of truth, which befits the intellect; and to be and to live and other like things which regard the natural well-being; all of which are included in the object of the will, as so many particular goods.