Obj. 2:  Further, the judicial precepts are distinct from the moral precepts, as stated above (Q. 99, A. 4).  But there are many moral precepts which direct man as to his neighbor:  as is evidently the case with the seven precepts of the second table.  Therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from directing man as to his neighbor.

Obj. 3:  Further, as the ceremonial precepts relate to God, so do the judicial precepts relate to one’s neighbor, as stated above (Q. 99, A. 4; Q. 101, A. 1).  But among the ceremonial precepts there are some which concern man himself, such as observances in matter of food and apparel, of which we have already spoken (Q. 102, A. 6, ad 1, 6).  Therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from directing man as to his neighbor.

On the contrary, It is reckoned (Ezech. 18:8) among other works of a good and just man, that “he hath executed true judgment between man and man.”  But judicial precepts are so called from “judgment.”  Therefore it seems that the judicial precepts were those which directed the relations between man and man.

I answer that, As is evident from what we have stated above (Q. 95, A. 2; Q. 99, A. 4), in every law, some precepts derive their binding force from the dictate of reason itself, because natural reason dictates that something ought to be done or to be avoided.  These are called “moral” precepts:  since human morals are based on reason.  At the same time there are other precepts which derive their binding force, not from the very dictate of reason (because, considered in themselves, they do not imply an obligation of something due or undue); but from some institution, Divine or human:  and such are certain determinations of the moral precepts.  When therefore the moral precepts are fixed by Divine institution in matters relating to man’s subordination to God, they are called “ceremonial” precepts:  but when they refer to man’s relations to other men, they are called “judicial” precepts.  Hence there are two conditions attached to the judicial precepts:  viz. first, that they refer to man’s relations to other men; secondly, that they derive their binding force not from reason alone, but in virtue of their institution.

Reply Obj. 1:  Judgments emanate through the official pronouncement of certain men who are at the head of affairs, and in whom the judicial power is vested.  Now it belongs to those who are at the head of affairs to regulate not only litigious matters, but also voluntary contracts which are concluded between man and man, and whatever matters concern the community at large and the government thereof.  Consequently the judicial precepts are not only those which concern actions at law; but also all those that are directed to the ordering of one man in relation to another, which ordering is subject to the direction of the sovereign as supreme judge.

Reply Obj. 2:  This argument holds in respect of those precepts which direct man in his relations to his neighbor, and derive their binding force from the mere dictate of reason.