The solution to the argument in the contrary sense is clear from what has been said above (A. 2, ad 2).  For the useful and the righteous are not species of good in an equal degree, but are as that which is for its own sake and that which is for the sake of something else:  wherefore the act of the will can be directed to one and not to the other; but not conversely. ________________________

QUESTION 9

OF THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL
(In Six Articles)

We must now consider what moves the will:  and under this head there are six points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether the will is moved by the intellect?

(2) Whether it is moved by the sensitive appetite?

(3) Whether the will moves itself?

(4) Whether it is moved by an extrinsic principle?

(5) Whether it is moved by a heavenly body?

(6) Whether the will is moved by God alone as by an extrinsic principle? ________________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 9, Art. 1]

Whether the Will Is Moved by the Intellect?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the will is not moved by the intellect.  For Augustine says on Ps. 118:20:  “My soul hath coveted to long for Thy justifications:  The intellect flies ahead, the desire follows sluggishly or not at all:  we know what is good, but deeds delight us not.”  But it would not be so, if the will were moved by the intellect:  because movement of the movable results from motion of the mover.  Therefore the intellect does not move the will.

Obj. 2:  Further, the intellect in presenting the appetible object to the will, stands in relation to the will, as the imagination in representing the appetible object to the sensitive appetite.  But the imagination, in presenting the appetible object, does not remove the sensitive appetite:  indeed sometimes our imagination affects us no more than what is set before us in a picture, and moves us not at all (De Anima ii, 3).  Therefore neither does the intellect move the will.

Obj. 3:  Further, the same is not mover and moved in respect of the same thing.  But the will moves the intellect; for we exercise the intellect when we will.  Therefore the intellect does not move the will.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10) that “the appetible object is a mover not moved, whereas the will is a mover moved.”

I answer that, A thing requires to be moved by something in so far as it is in potentiality to several things; for that which is in potentiality needs to be reduced to act by something actual; and to do this is to move.  Now a power of the soul is seen to be in potentiality to different things in two ways:  first, with regard to acting and not acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action.  Thus the sight sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not:  and sometimes it sees white, and sometimes black.  It needs therefore a mover in two respects, viz. as to the exercise or use of the act, and as to the determination of the act.  The first of these is on the part of the subject, which is sometimes acting, sometimes not acting:  while the other is on the part of the object, by reason of which the act is specified.