Accordingly, therefore, we must say that the mode of virtue is in some sort regarded both by human and by Divine law; in some respect it is regarded by the Divine, but not by the human law; and in another way, it is regarded neither by the human nor by the Divine law.  Now the mode of virtue consists in three things, as the Philosopher states in Ethic. ii.  The first is that man should act “knowingly”:  and this is subject to the judgment of both Divine and human law; because what a man does in ignorance, he does accidentally.  Hence according to both human and Divine law, certain things are judged in respect of ignorance to be punishable or pardonable.

The second point is that a man should act “deliberately,” i.e. “from choice, choosing that particular action for its own sake”; wherein a twofold internal movement is implied, of volition and of intention, about which we have spoken above (QQ. 8, 12):  and concerning these two, Divine law alone, and not human law, is competent to judge.  For human law does not punish the man who wishes to slay, and slays not:  whereas the Divine law does, according to Matt. 5:22:  “Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment.”

The third point is that he should “act from a firm and immovable principle”:  which firmness belongs properly to a habit, and implies that the action proceeds from a rooted habit.  In this respect, the mode of virtue does not fall under the precept either of Divine or of human law, since neither by man nor by God is he punished as breaking the law, who gives due honor to his parents and yet has not the habit of filial piety.

Reply Obj. 1:  The mode of doing acts of justice, which falls under the precept, is that they be done in accordance with right; but not that they be done from the habit of justice.

Reply Obj. 2:  The intention of the lawgiver is twofold.  His aim, in the first place, is to lead men to something by the precepts of the law:  and this is virtue.  Secondly, his intention is brought to bear on the matter itself of the precept:  and this is something leading or disposing to virtue, viz. an act of virtue.  For the end of the precept and the matter of the precept are not the same:  just as neither in other things is the end the same as that which conduces to the end.

Reply Obj. 3:  That works of virtue should be done without sadness, falls under the precept of the Divine law; for whoever works with sadness works unwillingly.  But to work with pleasure, i.e. joyfully or cheerfully, in one respect falls under the precept, viz. in so far as pleasure ensues from the love of God and one’s neighbor (which love falls under the precept), and love causes pleasure:  and in another respect does not fall under the precept, in so far as pleasure ensues from a habit; for “pleasure taken in a work proves the existence of a habit,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 3.  For an act may give pleasure either on account of its end, or through its proceeding from a becoming habit. ________________________