Now the precepts of the decalogue contain the very intention of the lawgiver, who is God.  For the precepts of the first table, which direct us to God, contain the very order to the common and final good, which is God; while the precepts of the second table contain the order of justice to be observed among men, that nothing undue be done to anyone, and that each one be given his due; for it is in this sense that we are to take the precepts of the decalogue.  Consequently the precepts of the decalogue admit of no dispensation whatever.

Reply Obj. 1:  The Philosopher is not speaking of the natural law which contains the very order of justice:  for it is a never-failing principle that “justice should be preserved.”  But he is speaking in reference to certain fixed modes of observing justice, which fail to apply in certain cases.

Reply Obj. 2:  As the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:13), “God continueth faithful, He cannot deny Himself.”  But He would deny Himself if He were to do away with the very order of His own justice, since He is justice itself.  Wherefore God cannot dispense a man so that it be lawful for him not to direct himself to God, or not to be subject to His justice, even in those matters in which men are directed to one another.

Reply Obj. 3:  The slaying of a man is forbidden in the decalogue, in so far as it bears the character of something undue:  for in this sense the precept contains the very essence of justice.  Human law cannot make it lawful for a man to be slain unduly.  But it is not undue for evil-doers or foes of the common weal to be slain:  hence this is not contrary to the precept of the decalogue; and such a killing is no murder as forbidden by that precept, as Augustine observes (De Lib.  Arb. i, 4).  In like manner when a man’s property is taken from him, if it be due that he should lose it, this is not theft or robbery as forbidden by the decalogue.

Consequently when the children of Israel, by God’s command, took away the spoils of the Egyptians, this was not theft; since it was due to them by the sentence of God.  Likewise when Abraham consented to slay his son, he did not consent to murder, because his son was due to be slain by the command of God, Who is Lord of life and death:  for He it is Who inflicts the punishment of death on all men, both godly and ungodly, on account of the sin of our first parent, and if a man be the executor of that sentence by Divine authority, he will be no murderer any more than God would be.  Again Osee, by taking unto himself a wife of fornications, or an adulterous woman, was not guilty either of adultery or of fornication:  because he took unto himself one who was his by command of God, Who is the Author of the institution of marriage.

Accordingly, therefore, the precepts of the decalogue, as to the essence of justice which they contain, are unchangeable:  but as to any determination by application to individual actions—­for instance, that this or that be murder, theft or adultery, or not—­in this point they admit of change; sometimes by Divine authority alone, namely, in such matters as are exclusively of Divine institution, as marriage and the like; sometimes also by human authority, namely in such matters as are subject to human jurisdiction:  for in this respect men stand in the place of God:  and yet not in all respects.