Reply Obj. 1:  The same power regards opposites, but it is not referred to them in the same way.  Accordingly, the will is referred both to good and evil:  but to good by desiring it:  to evil, by shunning it.  Wherefore the actual desire of good is called “volition” [In Latin, ‘voluntas’.  To avoid confusion with “voluntas” (the will) St. Thomas adds a word of explanation, which in the translation may appear superfluous.], meaning thereby the act of the will; for it is in this sense that we are now speaking of the will.  On the other hand, the shunning of evil is better described as “nolition”:  wherefore, just as volition is of good, so nolition is of evil.

Reply Obj. 2:  A rational power is not to be directed to all opposite purposes, but to those which are contained under its proper object; for no power seeks other than its proper object.  Now, the object of the will is good.  Wherefore the will can be directed to such opposite purposes as are contained under good, such as to be moved or to be at rest, to speak or to be silent, and such like:  for the will can be directed to either under the aspect of good.

Reply Obj. 3:  That which is not a being in nature, is considered as a being in the reason, wherefore negations and privations are said to be “beings of reason.”  In this way, too, future things, in so far as they are apprehended, are beings.  Accordingly, in so far as such like are beings, they are apprehended under the aspect of good; and it is thus that the will is directed to them.  Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that “to lack evil is considered as a good.” ________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 8, Art. 2]

Whether Volition Is of the End Only, or Also of the Means?

Objection 1:  It would seem that volition is not of the means, but of the end only.  For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that “volition is of the end, while choice is of the means.”

Obj. 2:  Further, “For objects differing in genus there are corresponding different powers of the soul” (Ethic. vi, 1).  Now, the end and the means are in different genera of good:  because the end, which is a good either of rectitude or of pleasure, is in the genus “quality,” or “action,” or “passion”; whereas the good which is useful, and is directed to and end, is in the genus “relation” (Ethic. i, 6).  Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is not of the means.

Obj. 3:  Further, habits are proportionate to powers, since they are perfections thereof.  But in those habits which are called practical arts, the end belongs to one, and the means to another art; thus the use of a ship, which is its end, belongs to the (art of the) helmsman; whereas the building of the ship, which is directed to the end, belongs to the art of the shipwright.  Therefore, since volition is of the end, it is not of the means.

On the contrary, In natural things, it is by the same power that a thing passes through the middle space, and arrives at the terminus.  But the means are a kind of middle space, through which one arrives at the end or terminus.  Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is also of the means.