Obj. 2:  Further, man stands in the same relation to human law as God does to Divine law.  But man can dispense with the precepts of a law made by man.  Therefore, since the precepts of the decalogue are ordained by God, it seems that God can dispense with them.  Now our superiors are God’s viceregents on earth; for the Apostle says (2 Cor. 2:10):  “For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ.”  Therefore superiors can dispense with the precepts of the decalogue.

Obj. 3:  Further, among the precepts of the decalogue is one forbidding murder.  But it seems that a dispensation is given by men in this precept:  for instance, when according to the prescription of human law, such as evil-doers or enemies are lawfully slain.  Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable.

Obj. 4:  Further, the observance of the Sabbath is ordained by a precept of the decalogue.  But a dispensation was granted in this precept; for it is written (1 Macc. 2:4):  “And they determined in that day, saying:  Whosoever shall come up to fight against us on the Sabbath-day, we will fight against him.”  Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable.

On the contrary, are the words of Isa. 24:5, where some are reproved for that “they have changed the ordinance, they have broken the everlasting covenant”; which, seemingly, apply principally to the precepts of the decalogue.  Therefore the precepts of the decalogue cannot be changed by dispensation.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 96, A. 6; Q. 97, A. 4), precepts admit of dispensation, when there occurs a particular case in which, if the letter of the law be observed, the intention of the lawgiver is frustrated.  Now the intention of every lawgiver is directed first and chiefly to the common good; secondly, to the order of justice and virtue, whereby the common good is preserved and attained.  If therefore there be any precepts which contain the very preservation of the common good, or the very order of justice and virtue, such precepts contain the intention of the lawgiver, and therefore are indispensable.  For instance, if in some community a law were enacted, such as this—­that no man should work for the destruction of the commonwealth, or betray the state to its enemies, or that no man should do anything unjust or evil, such precepts would not admit of dispensation.  But if other precepts were enacted, subordinate to the above, and determining certain special modes of procedure, these latter precepts would admit of dispensation, in so far as the omission of these precepts in certain cases would not be prejudicial to the former precepts which contain the intention of the lawgiver.  For instance if, for the safeguarding of the commonwealth, it were enacted in some city that from each ward some men should keep watch as sentries in case of siege, some might be dispensed from this on account of some greater utility.