Reply Obj. 5:  The pleasure of adultery and the usefulness of wealth, in so far as they have the character of pleasurable or useful good, are of themselves, objects of appetite:  and for this reason they needed to be forbidden not only in the deed but also in the desire.  But murder and falsehood are, of themselves, objects of repulsion (since it is natural for man to love his neighbor and the truth):  and are desired only for the sake of something else.  Consequently with regard to sins of murder and false witness, it was necessary to proscribe, not sins of thought, but only sins of deed.

Reply Obj. 6:  As stated above (Q. 25, A. 1), all the passions of the irascible faculty arise from the passions of the concupiscible part.  Hence, as the precepts of the decalogue are, as it were, the first elements of the Law, there was no need for mention of the irascible passions, but only of the concupiscible passions. ________________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 6]

Whether the Ten Precepts of the Decalogue Are Set in Proper Order?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the ten precepts of the decalogue are not set in proper order.  Because love of one’s neighbor is seemingly previous to love of God, since our neighbor is better known to us than God is; according to 1 John 4:20:  “He that loveth not his brother, whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?” But the first three precepts belong to the love of God, while the other seven pertain to the love of our neighbor.  Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are not set in proper order.

Obj. 2:  Further, the acts of virtue are prescribed by the affirmative precepts, and acts of vice are forbidden by the negative precepts.  But according to Boethius in his commentary on the Categories [Lib. iv, cap.  De Oppos.], vices should be uprooted before virtues are sown.  Therefore among the precepts concerning our neighbor, the negative precepts should have preceded the affirmative.

Obj. 3:  Further, the precepts of the Law are about men’s actions.  But actions of thought precede actions of word or outward deed.  Therefore the precepts about not coveting, which regard our thoughts, are unsuitably placed last in order.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 13:1):  “The things that are of God, are well ordered” [Vulg.:  ’Those that are, are ordained of God’].  But the precepts of the decalogue were given immediately by God, as stated above (A. 3).  Therefore they are arranged in becoming order.

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 3, 5, ad 1), the precepts of the decalogue are such as the mind of man is ready to grasp at once.  Now it is evident that a thing is so much the more easily grasped by the reason, as its contrary is more grievous and repugnant to reason.  Moreover, it is clear, since the order of reason begins with the end, that, for a man to be inordinately disposed towards his end,