Reply Obj. 1:  Good directed to the end is said to be useful; and this implies some kind of relation:  wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 6) that “the good in the genus ‘relation’ is the useful.”  Now, in the genus “relation” a thing is denominated not only according to that which is inherent in the thing, but also according to that which is extrinsic to it:  as may be seen in the expressions “right” and “left,” “equal” and “unequal,” and such like.  Accordingly, since the goodness of acts consists in their utility to the end, nothing hinders their being called good or bad according to their proportion to extrinsic things that are adjacent to them.

Reply Obj. 2:  Accidents which are altogether accidental are neglected by every art, by reason of their uncertainty and infinity.  But such like accidents are not what we call circumstances; because circumstances although, as stated above (A. 1), they are extrinsic to the act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by being related to it.  Proper accidents, however, come under the consideration of art.

Reply Obj. 3:  The consideration of circumstances belongs to the moralist, the politician, and the orator.  To the moralist, in so far as with respect to circumstances we find or lose the mean of virtue in human acts and passions.  To the politician and to the orator, in so far as circumstances make acts to be worthy of praise or blame, of excuse or indictment.  In different ways, however:  because where the orator persuades, the politician judges.  To the theologian this consideration belongs, in all the aforesaid ways:  since to him all the other arts are subservient:  for he has to consider virtuous and vicious acts, just as the moralist does; and with the orator and politician he considers acts according as they are deserving of reward or punishment. ________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 7, Art. 3]

Whether the Circumstances Are Properly Set Forth in the Third Book of
Ethics?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the circumstances are not properly set forth in Ethic. iii, 1.  For a circumstance of an act is described as something outside the act.  Now time and place answer to this description.  Therefore there are only two circumstances, to wit, “when” and “where.”

Obj. 2:  Further, we judge from the circumstances whether a thing is well or ill done.  But this belongs to the mode of an act.  Therefore all the circumstances are included under one, which is the “mode of acting.”

Obj. 3:  Further, circumstances are not part of the substance of an act.  But the causes of an act seem to belong to its substance.  Therefore no circumstance should be taken from the cause of the act itself.  Accordingly, neither “who,” nor “why,” nor “about what,” are circumstances:  since “who” refers to the efficient cause, “why” to the final cause, and “about what” to the material cause.

On the contrary is the authority of the Philosopher in Ethic. iii, 1.