affect the community in one respect, and individuals in another.  These are called “privileges,” i.e. “private laws,” as it were, because they regard private persons, although their power extends to many matters; and in regard to these, he adds, “and further, all particular acts of legislation.”  Other matters are legal, not through being laws, but through being applications of general laws to particular cases:  such are decrees which have the force of law; and in regard to these, he adds “all matters subject to decrees.”

Reply Obj. 2:  A principle of direction should be applicable to many; wherefore (Metaph. x, text. 4) the Philosopher says that all things belonging to one genus, are measured by one, which is the principle in that genus.  For if there were as many rules or measures as there are things measured or ruled, they would cease to be of use, since their use consists in being applicable to many things.  Hence law would be of no use, if it did not extend further than to one single act.  Because the decrees of prudent men are made for the purpose of directing individual actions; whereas law is a general precept, as stated above (Q. 92, A. 2, Obj. 2).

Reply Obj. 3:  “We must not seek the same degree of certainty in all things” (Ethic. i, 3).  Consequently in contingent matters, such as natural and human things, it is enough for a thing to be certain, as being true in the greater number of instances, though at times and less frequently it fail. ________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 96, Art. 2]

Whether It Belongs to the Human Law to Repress All Vices?

Objection 1:  It would seem that it belongs to human law to repress all vices.  For Isidore says (Etym. v, 20) that “laws were made in order that, in fear thereof, man’s audacity might be held in check.”  But it would not be held in check sufficiently, unless all evils were repressed by law.  Therefore human laws should repress all evils.

Obj. 2:  Further, the intention of the lawgiver is to make the citizens virtuous.  But a man cannot be virtuous unless he forbear from all kinds of vice.  Therefore it belongs to human law to repress all vices.

Obj. 3:  Further, human law is derived from the natural law, as stated above (Q. 95, A. 2).  But all vices are contrary to the law of nature.  Therefore human law should repress all vices.

On the contrary, We read in De Lib.  Arb. i, 5:  “It seems to me that the law which is written for the governing of the people rightly permits these things, and that Divine providence punishes them.”  But Divine providence punishes nothing but vices.  Therefore human law rightly allows some vices, by not repressing them.