what laws to make; whereas judgment on each single case has to be pronounced as soon as it arises:  and it is easier for man to see what is right, by taking many instances into consideration, than by considering one solitary fact.  Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of future events; whereas those who sit in judgment judge of things present, towards which they are affected by love, hatred, or some kind of cupidity; wherefore their judgment is perverted.

Since then the animated justice of the judge is not found in every man, and since it can be deflected, therefore it was necessary, whenever possible, for the law to determine how to judge, and for very few matters to be left to the decision of men.

Reply Obj. 3:  Certain individual facts which cannot be covered by the law “have necessarily to be committed to judges,” as the Philosopher says in the same passage:  for instance, “concerning something that has happened or not happened,” and the like. ________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 95, Art. 2]

Whether Every Human Law Is Derived from the Natural Law?

Objection 1:  It would seem that not every human law is derived from the natural law.  For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that “the legal just is that which originally was a matter of indifference.”  But those things which arise from the natural law are not matters of indifference.  Therefore the enactments of human laws are not derived from the natural law.

Obj. 2:  Further, positive law is contrasted with natural law, as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4) and the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7).  But those things which flow as conclusions from the general principles of the natural law belong to the natural law, as stated above (Q. 94, A. 4).  Therefore that which is established by human law does not belong to the natural law.

Obj. 3:  Further, the law of nature is the same for all; since the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that “the natural just is that which is equally valid everywhere.”  If therefore human laws were derived from the natural law, it would follow that they too are the same for all:  which is clearly false.

Obj. 4:  Further, it is possible to give a reason for things which are derived from the natural law.  But “it is not possible to give the reason for all the legal enactments of the lawgivers,” as the jurist says [Pandect.  Justin. lib. i, ff, tit. iii, v; De Leg. et Senat.].  Therefore not all human laws are derived from the natural law.

On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii):  “Things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the laws.”

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib.  Arb. i, 5) “that which is not just seems to be no law at all”:  wherefore the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice.  Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just, from being right, according to the rule of reason.  But the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has been stated above (Q. 91, A. 2, ad 2).  Consequently every human law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature.  But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.