and consequently, although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects.  Accordingly then in speculative matters truth is the same in all men, both as to principles and as to conclusions:  although the truth is not known to all as regards the conclusions, but only as regards the principles which are called common notions.  But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles:  and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all.

It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same for all, and is equally known by all.  As to the proper conclusions of the speculative reason, the truth is the same for all, but is not equally known to all:  thus it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, although it is not known to all.  But as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all.  Thus it is right and true for all to act according to reason:  and from this principle it follows as a proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to another should be restored to their owner.  Now this is true for the majority of cases:  but it may happen in a particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they are claimed for the purpose of fighting against one’s country.  And this principle will be found to fail the more, according as we descend further into detail, e.g. if one were to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such and such a guarantee, or in such and such a way; because the greater the number of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the principle may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to restore.

Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge.  But as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions, as it were, of those general principles, it is the same for all in the majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in some few cases it may fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles (just as natures subject to generation and corruption fail in some few cases on account of some obstacle), and as to knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of nature; thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural law, was not considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi).

Reply Obj. 1:  The meaning of the sentence quoted is not that whatever is contained in the Law and the Gospel belongs to the natural law, since they contain many things that are above nature; but that whatever belongs to the natural law is fully contained in them.  Wherefore Gratian, after saying that “the natural law is what is contained in the Law and the Gospel,” adds at once, by way of example, “by which everyone is commanded to do to others as he would be done by.”