Reply Obj. 1:  Temperance is about the natural concupiscences of food, drink and sexual matters, which are indeed ordained to the natural common good, just as other matters of law are ordained to the moral common good.

Reply Obj. 2:  By human nature we may mean either that which is proper to man—­and in this sense all sins, as being against reason, are also against nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 30):  or we may mean that nature which is common to man and other animals; and in this sense, certain special sins are said to be against nature; thus contrary to sexual intercourse, which is natural to all animals, is unisexual lust, which has received the special name of the unnatural crime.

Reply Obj. 3:  This argument considers acts in themselves.  For it is owing to the various conditions of men, that certain acts are virtuous for some, as being proportionate and becoming to them, while they are vicious for others, as being out of proportion to them. ________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 94, Art. 4]

Whether the Natural Law Is the Same in All Men?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the natural law is not the same in all.  For it is stated in the Decretals (Dist. i) that “the natural law is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel.”  But this is not common to all men; because, as it is written (Rom. 10:16), “all do not obey the gospel.”  Therefore the natural law is not the same in all men.

Obj. 2:  Further, “Things which are according to the law are said to be just,” as stated in Ethic. v.  But it is stated in the same book that nothing is so universally just as not to be subject to change in regard to some men.  Therefore even the natural law is not the same in all men.

Obj. 3:  Further, as stated above (AA. 2, 3), to the natural law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature.  Now different men are naturally inclined to different things; some to the desire of pleasures, others to the desire of honors, and other men to other things.  Therefore there is not one natural law for all.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 4):  “The natural law is common to all nations.”

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 2, 3), to the natural law belong those things to which a man is inclined naturally:  and among these it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason.  Now the process of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated in Phys. i.  The speculative reason, however, is differently situated in this matter, from the practical reason.  For, since the speculative reason is busied chiefly with necessary things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth without fail.  The practical reason, on the other hand, is busied with contingent matters, about which human actions are concerned: