of justice, and to the satisfying of anger:  the result being that there would be several acts in different species of morality:  since in one way there will be an act of virtue, in another, an act of vice.  For a movement does not receive its species from that which is its terminus accidentally, but only from that which is its per se terminus.  Now moral ends are accidental to a natural thing, and conversely the relation to a natural end is accidental to morality.  Consequently there is no reason why acts which are the same considered in their natural species, should not be diverse, considered in their moral species, and conversely. ________________________

Fourth article [I-ii, Q. 1, Art. 4]

Whether There Is One Last End of Human Life?

Objection 1:  It would seem that there is no last end of human life, but that we proceed to infinity.  For good is essentially diffusive, as Dionysius states (Div.  Nom. iv).  Consequently if that which proceeds from good is itself good, the latter must needs diffuse some other good:  so that the diffusion of good goes on indefinitely.  But good has the nature of an end.  Therefore there is an indefinite series of ends.

Obj. 2:  Further, things pertaining to the reason can be multiplied to infinity:  thus mathematical quantities have no limit.  For the same reason the species of numbers are infinite, since, given any number, the reason can think of one yet greater.  But desire of the end is consequent on the apprehension of the reason.  Therefore it seems that there is also an infinite series of ends.

Obj. 3:  Further, the good and the end is the object of the will.  But the will can react on itself an infinite number of times:  for I can will something, and will to will it, and so on indefinitely.  Therefore there is an infinite series of ends of the human will, and there is no last end of the human will.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 2) that “to suppose a thing to be indefinite is to deny that it is good.”  But the good is that which has the nature of an end.  Therefore it is contrary to the nature of an end to proceed indefinitely.  Therefore it is necessary to fix one last end.

I answer that, Absolutely speaking, it is not possible to proceed indefinitely in the matter of ends, from any point of view.  For in whatsoever things there is an essential order of one to another, if the first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must of necessity be removed also.  Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5) that we cannot proceed to infinitude in causes of movement, because then there would be no first mover, without which neither can the others move, since they move only through being moved by the first mover.  Now there is to be observed a twofold order in ends—­the order of intention and the order of execution:  and in either of these orders there must be something