propositions whose terms are known to all, as, “Every whole is greater than its part,” and, “Things equal to one and the same are equal to one another.”  But some propositions are self-evident only to the wise, who understand the meaning of the terms of such propositions:  thus to one who understands that an angel is not a body, it is self-evident that an angel is not circumscriptively in a place:  but this is not evident to the unlearned, for they cannot grasp it.

Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended universally.  For that which, before aught else, falls under apprehension, is being, the notion of which is included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends.  Wherefore the first indemonstrable principle is that “the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time,” which is based on the notion of being and not-being: and on this principle all others are based, as is stated in Metaph. iv, text. 9.  Now as being is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so good is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action:  since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good.  Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. that “good is that which all things seek after.”  Hence this is the first precept of law, that “good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.”  All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this:  so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man’s good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided.

Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance.  Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law.  Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances:  inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature:  and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law.  Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals:  and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law, “which nature has taught to all animals” [Pandect.  Just.  I, tit. i], such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth.  Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him:  thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society:  and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.