Obj. 2:  Further, it is essential to a law that it be promulgated by word, as stated above (Q. 90, A. 4).  But Word is a Personal name in God, as stated in the First Part (Q. 34, A. 1):  whereas type refers to the Essence.  Therefore the eternal law is not the same as a Divine type.

Obj. 3:  Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxx):  “We see a law above our minds, which is called truth.”  But the law which is above our minds is the eternal law.  Therefore truth is the eternal law.  But the idea of truth is not the same as the idea of a type.  Therefore the eternal law is not the same as the sovereign type.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib.  Arb. i, 6) that “the eternal law is the sovereign type, to which we must always conform.”

I answer that, Just as in every artificer there pre-exists a type of the things that are made by his art, so too in every governor there must pre-exist the type of the order of those things that are to be done by those who are subject to his government.  And just as the type of the things yet to be made by an art is called the art or exemplar of the products of that art, so too the type in him who governs the acts of his subjects, bears the character of a law, provided the other conditions be present which we have mentioned above (Q. 90).  Now God, by His wisdom, is the Creator of all things in relation to which He stands as the artificer to the products of his art, as stated in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 8).  Moreover He governs all the acts and movements that are to be found in each single creature, as was also stated in the First Part (Q. 103, A. 5).  Wherefore as the type of the Divine Wisdom, inasmuch as by It all things are created, has the character of art, exemplar or idea; so the type of Divine Wisdom, as moving all things to their due end, bears the character of law.  Accordingly the eternal law is nothing else than the type of Divine Wisdom, as directing all actions and movements.

Reply Obj. 1:  Augustine is speaking in that passage of the ideal types which regard the proper nature of each single thing; and consequently in them there is a certain distinction and plurality, according to their different relations to things, as stated in the First Part (Q. 15, A. 2).  But law is said to direct human acts by ordaining them to the common good, as stated above (Q. 90, A. 2).  And things, which are in themselves different, may be considered as one, according as they are ordained to one common thing.  Wherefore the eternal law is one since it is the type of this order.

Reply Obj. 2:  With regard to any sort of word, two points may be considered:  viz. the word itself, and that which is expressed by the word.  For the spoken word is something uttered by the mouth of man, and expresses that which is signified by the human word.  The same applies to the human mental word, which is nothing else than something conceived by the mind, by which man expresses his thoughts mentally.