Reply Obj. 3:  The child that is beginning to have the use of reason can refrain from other mortal sins for a time, but it is not free from the aforesaid sin of omission, unless it turns to God as soon as possible.  For the first thing that occurs to a man who has discretion, is to think of himself, and to direct other things to himself as to their end, since the end is the first thing in the intention.  Therefore this is the time when man is bound by God’s affirmative precept, which the Lord expressed by saying (Zech. 1:3):  “Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you.” ________________________

TREATISE ON LAW (QQ. 90-108)
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QUESTION 90

OF THE ESSENCE OF LAW
(In Four Articles)

We have now to consider the extrinsic principles of acts.  Now the extrinsic principle inclining to evil is the devil, of whose temptations we have spoken in the First Part (Q. 114).  But the extrinsic principle moving to good is God, Who both instructs us by means of His Law, and assists us by His Grace:  wherefore in the first place we must speak of law; in the second place, of grace.

Concerning law, we must consider:  (1) Law itself in general; (2) its parts.  Concerning law in general three points offer themselves for our consideration:  (1) Its essence; (2) The different kinds of law; (3) The effects of law.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether law is something pertaining to reason?

(2) Concerning the end of law;

(3) Its cause;

(4) The promulgation of law.
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 90, Art. 1]

Whether Law Is Something Pertaining to Reason?

Objection 1:  It would seem that law is not something pertaining to reason.  For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:23):  “I see another law in my members,” etc.  But nothing pertaining to reason is in the members; since the reason does not make use of a bodily organ.  Therefore law is not something pertaining to reason.

Obj. 2:  Further, in the reason there is nothing else but power, habit, and act.  But law is not the power itself of reason.  In like manner, neither is it a habit of reason:  because the habits of reason are the intellectual virtues of which we have spoken above (Q. 57).  Nor again is it an act of reason:  because then law would cease, when the act of reason ceases, for instance, while we are asleep.  Therefore law is nothing pertaining to reason.

Obj. 3:  Further, the law moves those who are subject to it to act aright.  But it belongs properly to the will to move to act, as is evident from what has been said above (Q. 9, A. 1).  Therefore law pertains, not to the reason, but to the will; according to the words of the Jurist (Lib. i, ff., De Const.  Prin. leg. i):  “Whatsoever pleaseth the sovereign, has force of law.”