execution of the act of reason is not subject to the act of deliberation which proceeds from a higher good, as stated above (Q. 74, A. 10); and that the human mind be out of order as regards things directed to the end, the due order of the end being safeguarded, is due to the fact that the things referred to the end are not infallibly directed under the end, which holds the highest place, being the beginning, as it were, in matters concerning the appetite, as stated above (Q. 10, AA. 1, 2, ad 3; Q. 72, A. 5).  Now, in the state of innocence, as stated in the First Part (Q. 95, A. 1), there was an unerring stability of order, so that the lower powers were always subjected to the higher, so long as man remained subject to God, as Augustine says (De Civ.  Dei xiv, 13).  Hence there can be no inordinateness in man, unless first of all the highest part of man were not subject to God, which constitutes a mortal sin.  From this it is evident that, in the state of innocence, man could not commit a venial sin, before committing a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 1:  In the passage quoted, venial is not taken in the same sense as we take it now; but by venial sin we mean that which is easily forgiven.

Reply Obj. 2:  This vainglory which preceded man’s downfall, was his first mortal sin, for it is stated to have preceded his downfall into the outward act of sin.  This vainglory was followed, in the man, by the desire to make and experiment, and in the woman, by doubt, for she gave way to vainglory, merely through hearing the serpent mention the precept, as though she refused to be held in check by the precept.

Reply Obj. 3:  Mortal sin is opposed to the integrity of the original state in the fact of its destroying that state:  this a venial sin cannot do.  And because the integrity of the primitive state is incompatible with any inordinateness whatever, the result is that the first man could not sin venially, before committing a mortal sin. ________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 89, Art. 4]

Whether a Good or a Wicked Angel Can Sin Venially?

Objection 1:  It seems that a good or wicked angel can sin venially.  Because man agrees with the angels in the higher part of his soul which is called the mind, according to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxix in Evang.) that “man understands in common with the angels.”  But man can commit a venial sin in the higher part of his soul.  Therefore an angel can commit a venial sin also.

Obj. 2:  Further, He that can do more can do less.  But an angel could love a created good more than God, and he did, by sinning mortally.  Therefore he could also love a creature less than God inordinately, by sinning venially.

Obj. 3:  Further, wicked angels seem to do things which are venial sins generically, by provoking men to laughter, and other like frivolities.  Now the circumstance of the person does not make a mortal sin to be venial as stated above (A. 3), unless there is a special prohibition, which is not the case in point.  Therefore an angel can sin venially.