sin incurs a debt of temporal punishment, as stated above (Q. 87, AA. 3, 5).  It is also evident as regards the pain of loss, because mortal sins deserve to be punished by the privation of seeing God, to which no other punishment is comparable, as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiv in Matth.).  It is also evident as regards the pain of sense, as to the remorse of conscience; although as to the pain of fire, the punishments may perhaps not be improportionate to one another.

If, however, this be taken as meaning that many venial sins make one mortal sin dispositively, it is true, as was shown above (A. 3) with regard to the two different manners of disposition, whereby venial sin disposes to mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 1:  Augustine is referring to the fact of many venial sins making one mortal sin dispositively.

Reply Obj. 2:  The same movement of the sensuality which preceded the consent of reason can never become a mortal sin; but the movement of the reason in consenting is a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 3:  Disease of the body is not an act, but an abiding disposition; wherefore, while remaining the same disease, it may undergo change.  On the other hand, venial sin is a transient act, which cannot be taken up again:  so that in this respect the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 4:  A disposition that becomes a habit, is like an imperfect thing in the same species; thus imperfect science, by being perfected, becomes a habit.  On the other hand, venial sin is a disposition to something differing generically, even as an accident which disposes to a substantial form, into which it is never changed. ________________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 88, Art. 5]

Whether a Circumstance Can Make a Venial Sin to Be Mortal?

Objection 1:  It would seem that a circumstance can make a venial sin mortal.  For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm. xli) that “if anger continue for a long time, or if drunkenness be frequent, they become mortal sins.”  But anger and drunkenness are not mortal but venial sins generically, else they would always be mortal sins.  Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal.

Obj. 2:  Further, the Master says (Sentent. ii, D, 24) that delectation, if morose [See Q. 74, A. 6], is a mortal sin, but that if it be not morose, it is a venial sin.  Now moroseness is a circumstance.  Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal.

Obj. 3:  Further, evil and good differ more than venial and mortal sin, both of which are generically evil.  But a circumstance makes a good act to be evil, as when a man gives an alms for vainglory.  Much more, therefore, can it make a venial sin to be mortal.

On the contrary, Since a circumstance is an accident, its quantity cannot exceed that of the act itself, derived from the act’s genus, because the subject always excels its accident.  If, therefore, an act be venial by reason of its genus, it cannot become mortal by reason of an accident:  since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpasses the quantity of venial sin, as is evident from what has been said (Q. 72, A. 5, ad 1; Q. 87, A. 5, ad 1).