Reply Obj. 3:  As the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4) the movement of an animal, whereby at times an animal is moved against the natural inclination of the body, although it is not natural to the body, is nevertheless somewhat natural to the animal, to which it is natural to be moved according to its appetite.  Accordingly this is violent, not simply but in a certain respect.  The same remark applies in the case of one who contorts his limbs in a way that is contrary to their natural disposition.  For this is violent in a certain respect, i.e. as to that particular limb; but not simply, i.e. as to the man himself. ________________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 6, Art. 6]

Whether Fear Causes Involuntariness Simply?

Objection 1:  It would seem that fear causes involuntariness simply.  For just as violence regards that which is contrary to the will at the time, so fear regards a future evil which is repugnant to the will.  But violence causes involuntariness simply.  Therefore fear too causes involuntariness simply.

Obj. 2:  Further, that which is such of itself, remains such, whatever be added to it:  thus what is hot of itself, as long as it remains, is still hot, whatever be added to it.  But that which is done through fear, is involuntary in itself.  Therefore, even with the addition of fear, it is involuntary.

Obj. 3:  Further, that which is such, subject to a condition, is such in a certain respect; whereas what is such, without any condition, is such simply:  thus what is necessary, subject to a condition, is necessary in some respect:  but what is necessary absolutely, is necessary simply.  But that which is done through fear, is absolutely involuntary; and is not voluntary, save under a condition, namely, in order that the evil feared may be avoided.  Therefore that which is done through fear, is involuntary simply.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat.  Hom. xxx.] and the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that such things as are done through fear are “voluntary rather than involuntary.”

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) and likewise Gregory of Nyssa in his book on Man (Nemesius, De Nat.  Hom. xxx), such things are done through fear “are of a mixed character,” being partly voluntary and partly involuntary.  For that which is done through fear, considered in itself, is not voluntary; but it becomes voluntary in this particular case, in order, namely, to avoid the evil feared.

But if the matter be considered aright, such things are voluntary rather than involuntary; for they are voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect.  For a thing is said to be simply, according as it is in act; but according as it is only in apprehension, it is not simply, but in a certain respect.  Now that which is done through fear, is in act in so far as it is done.  For, since acts are concerned