Accordingly, man can be punished with a threefold punishment corresponding to the three orders to which the human will is subject.  In the first place a man’s nature is subjected to the order of his own reason; secondly, it is subjected to the order of another man who governs him either in spiritual or in temporal matters, as a member either of the state or of the household; thirdly, it is subjected to the universal order of the Divine government.  Now each of these orders is disturbed by sin, for the sinner acts against his reason, and against human and Divine law.  Wherefore he incurs a threefold punishment; one, inflicted by himself, viz. remorse of conscience; another, inflicted by man; and a third, inflicted by God.

Reply Obj. 1:  Punishment follows sin, inasmuch as this is an evil by reason of its being inordinate.  Wherefore just as evil is accidental to the sinner’s act, being beside his intention, so also is the debt of punishment.

Reply Obj. 2:  Further, a just punishment may be inflicted either by God or by man:  wherefore the punishment itself is the effect of sin, not directly but dispositively.  Sin, however, makes man deserving of punishment, and that is an evil:  for Dionysius says (Div.  Nom. iv) that “punishment is not an evil, but to deserve punishment is.”  Consequently the debt of punishment is considered to be directly the effect of sin.

Reply Obj. 3:  This punishment of the inordinate affection is due to sin as overturning the order of reason.  Nevertheless sin incurs a further punishment, through disturbing the order of the Divine or human law. ________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 87, Art. 2]

Whether Sin Can Be the Punishment of Sin?

Objection 1:  It would seem that sin cannot be the punishment of sin.  For the purpose of punishment is to bring man back to the good of virtue, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 9).  Now sin does not bring man back to the good of virtue, but leads him in the opposite direction.  Therefore sin is not the punishment of sin.

Obj. 2:  Further, just punishments are from God, as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 82).  But sin is not from God, and is an injustice.  Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin.

Obj. 3:  Further, the nature of punishment is to be something against the will.  But sin is something from the will, as shown above (Q. 74, AA. 1, 2).  Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin.

On the contrary, Gregory speaks (Hom. xi in Ezech.) that some sins are punishments of others.

I answer that, We may speak of sin in two ways:  first, in its essence, as such; secondly, as to that which is accidental thereto.  Sin as such can nowise be the punishment of another.  Because sin considered in its essence is something proceeding from the will, for it is from this that it derives the character of guilt.  Whereas punishment is essentially something against the will, as stated in the First Part (Q. 48, A. 5).  Consequently it is evident that sin regarded in its essence can nowise be the punishment of sin.