We must now consider the debt of punishment.  We shall consider (1) the debt itself; (2) mortal and venial sin, which differ in respect of the punishment due to them.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?

(2) Whether one sin can be the punishment of another?

(3) Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?

(4) Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment that is infinite in quantity?

(5) Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal and infinite punishment?

(6) Whether the debt of punishment can remain after sin?

(7) Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?

(8) Whether one person can incur punishment for another’s sin?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 87, Art. 1]

Whether the Debt of Punishment Is an Effect of Sin?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin.  For that which is accidentally related to a thing, does not seem to be its proper effect.  Now the debt of punishment is accidentally related to sin, for it is beside the intention of the sinner.  Therefore the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin.

Obj. 2:  Further, evil is not the cause of good.  But punishment is good, since it is just, and is from God.  Therefore it is not an effect of sin, which is evil.

Obj. 3:  Further, Augustine says (Confess. i) that “every inordinate affection is its own punishment.”  But punishment does not incur a further debt of punishment, because then it would go on indefinitely.  Therefore sin does not incur the debt of punishment.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 2:9):  “Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that worketh evil.”  But to work evil is to sin.  Therefore sin incurs a punishment which is signified by the words “tribulation and anguish.”

I answer that, It has passed from natural things to human affairs that whenever one thing rises up against another, it suffers some detriment therefrom.  For we observe in natural things that when one contrary supervenes, the other acts with greater energy, for which reason “hot water freezes more rapidly,” as stated in Meteor. i, 12.  Wherefore we find that the natural inclination of man is to repress those who rise up against him.  Now it is evident that all things contained in an order, are, in a manner, one, in relation to the principle of that order.  Consequently, whatever rises up against an order, is put down by that order or by the principle thereof.  And because sin is an inordinate act, it is evident that whoever sins, commits an offense against an order:  wherefore he is put down, in consequence, by that same order, which repression is punishment.