attaining its term, it is evident that it can be diminished indefinitely, because obstacles can be placed indefinitely, inasmuch as man can go on indefinitely adding sin to sin:  and yet it cannot be destroyed entirely, because the root of this inclination always remains.  An example of this may be seen in a transparent body, which has an inclination to receive light, from the very fact that it is transparent; yet this inclination or aptitude is diminished on the part of supervening clouds, although it always remains rooted in the nature of the body.

Reply Obj. 1:  This objection avails when diminution is made by subtraction.  But here the diminution is made by raising obstacles, and this neither diminishes nor destroys the root of the inclination, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2:  The natural inclination is indeed wholly uniform:  nevertheless it stands in relation both to its principle and to its term, in respect of which diversity of relation, it is diminished on the one hand, and not on the other.

Reply Obj. 3:  Even in the lost the natural inclination to virtue remains, else they would have no remorse of conscience.  That it is not reduced to act is owing to their being deprived of grace by Divine justice.  Thus even in a blind man the aptitude to see remains in the very root of his nature, inasmuch as he is an animal naturally endowed with sight:  yet this aptitude is not reduced to act, for the lack of a cause capable of reducing it, by forming the organ requisite for sight. ________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 85, Art. 3]

Whether Weakness, Ignorance, Malice and Concupiscence Are Suitably
Reckoned As the Wounds of Nature Consequent Upon Sin?

Objection 1:  It would seem that weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are not suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin.  For one same thing is not both effect and cause of the same thing.  But these are reckoned to be causes of sin, as appears from what has been said above (Q. 76, A. 1; Q. 77, AA. 3, 5; Q. 78, A. 1).  Therefore they should not be reckoned as effects of sin.

Obj. 2:  Further, malice is the name of a sin.  Therefore it should have no place among the effects of sin.

Obj. 3:  Further, concupiscence is something natural, since it is an act of the concupiscible power.  But that which is natural should not be reckoned a wound of nature.  Therefore concupiscence should not be reckoned a wound of nature.

Obj. 4:  Further, it has been stated (Q. 77, A. 3) that to sin from weakness is the same as to sin from passion.  But concupiscence is a passion.  Therefore it should not be condivided with weakness.

Obj. 5:  Further, Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii, 67) reckons “two things to be punishments inflicted on the soul of the sinner, viz. ignorance and difficulty,” from which arise “error and vexation,” which four do not coincide with the four in question.  Therefore it seems that one or the other reckoning is incomplete.