Obj. 3:  Further, anger is not a principal passion.  Therefore it should not be placed among the principal vices.

Obj. 4:  Further, just as covetousness or avarice is the root of sin, so is pride the beginning of sin, as stated above (A. 2).  But avarice is reckoned to be one of the capital vices.  Therefore pride also should be placed among the capital vices.

Obj. 5:  Further, some sins are committed which cannot be caused through any of these:  as, for instance, when one sins through ignorance, or when one commits a sin with a good intention, e.g. steals in order to give an alms.  Therefore the capital vices are insufficiently enumerated.

On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory who enumerates them in this way (Moral. xxxi, 17).

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), the capital vices are those which give rise to others, especially by way of final cause.  Now this kind of origin may take place in two ways.  First, on account of the condition of the sinner, who is disposed so as to have a strong inclination for one particular end, the result being that he frequently goes forward to other sins.  But this kind of origin does not come under the consideration of art, because man’s particular dispositions are infinite in number.  Secondly, on account of a natural relationship of the ends to one another:  and it is in this way that most frequently one vice arises from another, so that this kind of origin can come under the consideration of art.

Accordingly therefore, those vices are called capital, whose ends have certain fundamental reasons for moving the appetite; and it is in respect of these fundamental reasons that the capital vices are differentiated.  Now a thing moves the appetite in two ways.  First, directly and of its very nature:  thus good moves the appetite to seek it, while evil, for the same reason, moves the appetite to avoid it.  Secondly, indirectly and on account of something else, as it were:  thus one seeks an evil on account of some attendant good, or avoids a good on account of some attendant evil.

Again, man’s good is threefold.  For, in the first place, there is a certain good of the soul, which derives its aspect of appetibility, merely through being apprehended, viz. the excellence of honor and praise, and this good is sought inordinately by vainglory. Secondly, there is the good of the body, and this regards either the preservation of the individual, e.g. meat and drink, which good is pursued inordinately by gluttony, or the preservation of the species, e.g. sexual intercourse, which good is sought inordinately by lust. Thirdly, there is external good, viz. riches, to which covetousness is referred.  These same four vices avoid inordinately the contrary evils.