Consequently perfect knowledge of the end leads to the perfect voluntary; inasmuch as, having apprehended the end, a man can, from deliberating about the end and the means thereto, be moved, or not, to gain that end.  But imperfect knowledge of the end leads to the imperfect voluntary; inasmuch as the agent apprehends the end, but does not deliberate, and is moved to the end at once.  Wherefore the voluntary in its perfection belongs to none but the rational nature:  whereas the imperfect voluntary is within the competency of even irrational animals.

Reply Obj. 1:  The will is the name of the rational appetite; and consequently it cannot be in things devoid of reason.  But the word “voluntary” is derived from “voluntas” (will), and can be extended to those things in which there is some participation of will, by way of likeness thereto.  It is thus that voluntary action is attributed to irrational animals, in so far as they are moved to an end, through some kind of knowledge.

Reply Obj. 2:  The fact that man is master of his actions, is due to his being able to deliberate about them:  for since the deliberating reason is indifferently disposed to opposite things, the will can be inclined to either.  But it is not thus that voluntariness is in irrational animals, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3:  Praise and blame are the result of the voluntary act, wherein is the perfect voluntary; such as is not to be found in irrational animals. ________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 6, Art. 3]

Whether There Can Be Voluntariness Without Any Act?

Objection 1:  It would seem that voluntariness cannot be without any act.  For that is voluntary which proceeds from the will.  But nothing can proceed from the will, except through some act, at least an act of the will.  Therefore there cannot be voluntariness without act.

Obj. 2:  Further, just as one is said to wish by an act of the will, so when the act of the will ceases, one is said not to wish.  But not to wish implies involuntariness, which is contrary to voluntariness.  Therefore there can be nothing voluntary when the act of the will ceases.

Obj. 3:  Further, knowledge is essential to the voluntary, as stated above (AA. 1, 2).  But knowledge involves an act.  Therefore voluntariness cannot be without some act.

On the contrary, The word “voluntary” is applied to that of which we are masters.  Now we are masters in respect of to act and not to act, to will and not to will.  Therefore just as to act and to will are voluntary, so also are not to act and not to will.