Reply Obj. 3:  He that sins through habit is always glad for what he does through habit, as long as he uses the habit.  But since he is able not to use the habit, and to think of something else, by means of his reason, which is not altogether corrupted, it may happen that while not using the habit he is sorry for what he has done through the habit.  And so it often happens that such a man is sorry for his sin not because sin in itself is displeasing to him, but on account of his reaping some disadvantage from the sin. ________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 78, Art. 3]

Whether One Who Sins Through Certain Malice, Sins Through Habit?

Objection 1:  It would seem that whoever sins through certain malice, sins through habit.  For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 9) that “an unjust action is not done as an unjust man does it,” i.e. through choice, “unless it be done through habit.”  Now to sin through certain malice is to sin through making a choice of evil, as stated above (A. 1).  Therefore no one sins through certain malice, unless he has the habit of sin.

Obj. 2:  Further, Origen says (Peri Archon iii) that “a man is not suddenly ruined and lost, but must needs fall away little by little.”  But the greatest fall seems to be that of the man who sins through certain malice.  Therefore a man comes to sin through certain malice, not from the outset, but from inveterate custom, which may engender a habit.

Obj. 3:  Further, whenever a man sins through certain malice, his will must needs be inclined of itself to the evil he chooses.  But by the nature of that power man is inclined, not to evil but to good.  Therefore if he chooses evil, this must be due to something supervening, which is passion or habit.  Now when a man sins through passion, he sins not through certain malice, but through weakness, as stated (Q. 77, A. 3).  Therefore whenever anyone sins through certain malice, he sins through habit.

On the contrary, The good habit stands in the same relation to the choice of something good, as the bad habit to the choice of something evil.  But it happens sometimes that a man, without having the habit of a virtue, chooses that which is good according to that virtue.  Therefore sometimes also a man, without having the habit of a vice, may choose evil, which is to sin through certain malice.

I answer that, The will is related differently to good and to evil.  Because from the very nature of the power, it is inclined to the rational good, as its proper object; wherefore every sin is said to be contrary to nature.  Hence, if a will be inclined, by its choice, to some evil, this must be occasioned by something else.  Sometimes, in fact, this is occasioned through some defect in the reason, as when anyone sins through ignorance; and sometimes this arises through the impulse of the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion.  Yet neither