QUESTION 78

OF THAT CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the cause of sin on the part of the will, viz. malice:  and under this head there are four points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether it is possible for anyone to sin through certain malice, i.e. purposely?

(2) Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice?

(3) Whether every one that sins through certain malice, sins through habit?

(4) Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice, than through passion? ________________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 78, Art. 1]

Whether Anyone Sins Through Certain Malice?

Objection 1:  It would seem that no one sins purposely, or through certain malice.  Because ignorance is opposed to purpose or certain malice.  Now “every evil man is ignorant,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1); and it is written (Prov. 14:22):  “They err that work evil.”  Therefore no one sins through certain malice.

Obj. 2:  Further, Dionysius says (Div.  Nom. iv) that “no one works intending evil.”  Now to sin through malice seems to denote the intention of doing evil [Alluding to the derivation of _malitia_ (malice) from _malum_ (evil)] in sinning, because an act is not denominated from that which is unintentional and accidental.  Therefore no one sins through malice.

Obj. 3:  Further, malice itself is a sin.  If therefore malice is a cause of sin, it follows that sin goes on causing sin indefinitely, which is absurd.  Therefore no one sins through malice.

On the contrary, It is written (Job 34:27):  “[Who] as it were on purpose have revolted from God [Vulg.:  ’Him’], and would not understand all His ways.”  Now to revolt from God is to sin.  Therefore some sin purposely or through certain malice.

I answer that, Man like any other being has naturally an appetite for the good; and so if his appetite incline away to evil, this is due to corruption or disorder in some one of the principles of man:  for it is thus that sin occurs in the actions of natural things.  Now the principles of human acts are the intellect, and the appetite, both rational (i.e. the will) and sensitive.  Therefore even as sin occurs in human acts, sometimes through a defect of the intellect, as when anyone sins through ignorance, and sometimes through a defect in the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion, so too does it occur through a defect consisting in a disorder of the will.  Now the will is out of order when it loves more the lesser good.  Again, the consequence of loving a thing less is that one chooses to suffer some hurt in its regard, in order to obtain a good that one loves more:  as when a man, even knowingly, suffers the loss of a limb, that he may save his life which he loves more.  Accordingly when an inordinate