Obj. 3:  Further, if it be said that it draws the reason from its knowledge of something in general, to form a contrary judgment about a particular matter—­on the contrary, if a universal and a particular proposition be opposed, they are opposed by contradiction, e.g.  “Every man,” and “Not every man.”  Now if two opinions contradict one another, they are contrary to one another, as stated in Peri Herm. ii.  If therefore anyone, while knowing something in general, were to pronounce an opposite judgment in a particular case, he would have two contrary opinions at the same time, which is impossible.

Obj. 4:  Further, whoever knows the universal, knows also the particular which he knows to be contained in the universal:  thus who knows that every mule is sterile, knows that this particular animal is sterile, provided he knows it to be a mule, as is clear from Poster. i, text. 2.  Now he who knows something in general, e.g. that “no fornication is lawful,” knows this general proposition to contain, for example, the particular proposition, “This is an act of fornication.”  Therefore it seems that his knowledge extends to the particular.

Obj. 5:  Further, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), “words express the thoughts of the mind.”  Now it often happens that man, while in a state of passion, confesses that what he has chosen is an evil, even in that particular case.  Therefore he has knowledge, even in particular.

Therefore it seems that the passions cannot draw the reason against its universal knowledge; because it is impossible for it to have universal knowledge together with an opposite particular judgment.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:23):  “I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin.”  Now the law that is in the members is concupiscence, of which he had been speaking previously.  Since then concupiscence is a passion, it seems that a passion draws the reason counter to its knowledge.

I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 2), the opinion of Socrates was that knowledge can never be overcome by passion; wherefore he held every virtue to be a kind of knowledge, and every sin a kind of ignorance.  In this he was somewhat right, because, since the object of the will is a good or an apparent good, it is never moved to an evil, unless that which is not good appear good in some respect to the reason; so that the will would never tend to evil, unless there were ignorance or error in the reason.  Hence it is written (Prov. 14:22):  “They err that work evil.”