Reply Obj. 4:  The drunken man deserves a “double punishment” for the two sins which he commits, viz. drunkenness, and the sin which results from his drunkenness:  and yet drunkenness, on account of the ignorance connected therewith, diminishes the resulting sin, and more, perhaps, than the gravity of the drunkenness implies, as stated above (ad 2).  It might also be said that the words quoted refer to an ordinance of the legislator named Pittacus, who ordered drunkards to be more severely punished if they assaulted anyone; having an eye, not to the indulgence which the drunkard might claim, but to expediency, since more harm is done by the drunk than by the sober, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii). ________________________

QUESTION 77

OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE (In Eight Articles)

We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of the sensitive appetite, as to whether a passion of the soul may be a cause of sin:  and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether a passion of the sensitive appetite can move or incline the will?

(2) Whether it can overcome the reason against the latter’s knowledge?

(3) Whether a sin resulting from a passion is a sin of weakness?

(4) Whether the passion of self-love is the cause of every sin?

(5) Of three causes mentioned in 1 John 2:16:  “Concupiscence of the eyes, Concupiscence of the flesh,” and “Pride of life.”

(6) Whether the passion which causes a sin diminishes it?

(7) Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?

(8) Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 1]

Whether the Will Is Moved by a Passion of the Sensitive Appetite?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the will is not moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite.  For no passive power is moved except by its object.  Now the will is a power both passive and active, inasmuch as it is mover and moved, as the Philosopher says of the appetitive power in general (De Anima iii, text. 54).  Since therefore the object of the will is not a passion of the sensitive appetite, but good defined by the reason, it seems that a passion of the sensitive appetite does not move the will.

Obj. 2:  Further, the higher mover is not moved by the lower; thus the soul is not moved by the body.  Now the will, which is the rational appetite, is compared to the sensitive appetite, as a higher mover to a lower:  for the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 57) that “the rational appetite moves the sensitive appetite, even as, in the heavenly bodies, one sphere moves another.”  Therefore the will cannot be moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite.

Obj. 3:  Further, nothing immaterial can be moved by that which is material.  Now the will is an immaterial power, because it does not use a corporeal organ, since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 42:  whereas the sensitive appetite is a material force, since it is seated in an organ of the body.  Therefore a passion of the sensitive appetite cannot move the intellective appetite.