Reply Obj. 3:  This definition of Happiness given by some—­“Happy is the man that has all he desires,” or, “whose every wish is fulfilled,” is a good and adequate definition, if it be understood in a certain way; but an inadequate definition if understood in another.  For if we understand it simply of all that man desires by his natural appetite, thus it is true that he who has all that he desires, is happy:  since nothing satisfies man’s natural desire, except the perfect good which is Happiness.  But if we understand it of those things that man desires according to the apprehension of the reason, thus it does not belong to Happiness, to have certain things that man desires; rather does it belong to unhappiness, in so far as the possession of such things hinders man from having all that he desires naturally; thus it is that reason sometimes accepts as true things that are a hindrance to the knowledge of truth.  And it was through taking this into consideration that Augustine added so as to include perfect Happiness—­that he “desires nothing amiss”:  although the first part suffices if rightly understood, to wit, that “happy is he who has all he desires.” ________________________

TREATISE ON HUMAN ACTS:  ACTS PECULIAR TO MAN (QQ. 6-21)
________________________

QUESTION 6

OF THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY
(In Eight Articles)

Since therefore Happiness is to be gained by means of certain acts, we must in due sequence consider human acts, in order to know by what acts we may obtain Happiness, and by what acts we are prevented from obtaining it.  But because operations and acts are concerned with things singular, consequently all practical knowledge is incomplete unless it take account of things in detail.  The study of Morals, therefore, since it treats of human acts, should consider first the general principles; and secondly matters of detail.

In treating of the general principles, the points that offer themselves for our consideration are (1) human acts themselves; (2) their principles.  Now of human acts some are proper to man; others are common to man and animals.  And since Happiness is man’s proper good, those acts which are proper to man have a closer connection with Happiness than have those which are common to man and the other animals.  First, then, we must consider those acts which are proper to man; secondly, those acts which are common to man and the other animals, and are called Passions.  The first of these points offers a twofold consideration:  (1) What makes a human act? (2) What distinguishes human acts?

And since those acts are properly called human which are voluntary, because the will is the rational appetite, which is proper to man; we must consider acts in so far as they are voluntary.

First, then, we must consider the voluntary and involuntary in general; secondly, those acts which are voluntary, as being elicited by the will, and as issuing from the will immediately; thirdly, those acts which are voluntary, as being commanded by the will, which issue from the will through the medium of the other powers.