Reply Obj. 3:  Deliberate consent to a sin does not always amount to contempt of the Divine law, but only when the sin is contrary to the Divine law. ________________________

TENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 10]

Whether Venial Sin Can Be in the Higher Reason As Such?

Objection 1:  It would seem that venial sin cannot be in the higher reason as such, i.e. as considering the eternal law.  For the act of a power is not found to fail except that power be inordinately disposed with regard to its object.  Now the object of the higher reason is the eternal law, in respect of which there can be no disorder without mortal sin.  Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such.

Obj. 2:  Further, since the reason is a deliberative power, there can be no act of reason without deliberation.  Now every inordinate movement in things concerning God, if it be deliberate, is a mortal sin.  Therefore venial sin is never in the higher reason as such.

Obj. 3:  Further, it happens sometimes that a sin which takes us unawares, is a venial sin.  Now a deliberate sin is a mortal sin, through the reason, in deliberating, having recourse to some higher good, by acting against which, man sins more grievously; just as when the reason in deliberating about an inordinate pleasurable act, considers that it is contrary to the law of God, it sins more grievously in consenting, than if it only considered that it is contrary to moral virtue.  But the higher reason cannot have recourse to any higher tribunal than its own object.  Therefore if a movement that takes us unawares is not a mortal sin, neither will the subsequent deliberation make it a mortal sin; which is clearly false.  Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such.

On the contrary, A sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin.  But it belongs to the higher reason as such.  Therefore there can be a venial sin in the higher reason as such.

I answer that, The higher reason regards its own object otherwise than the objects of the lower powers that are directed by the higher reason.  For it does not regard the objects of the lower powers, except in so far as it consults the eternal law about them, and so it does not regard them save by way of deliberation.  Now deliberate consent to what is a mortal sin in its genus, is itself a mortal sin; and consequently the higher reason always sins mortally, if the acts of the lower powers to which it consents are mortal sins.

With regard to its own object it has a twofold act, viz. simple intuition, and deliberation, in respect of which it again consults the eternal law about its own object.  But in respect of simple intuition, it can have an inordinate movement about Divine things, as when a man suffers a sudden movement of unbelief.  And although unbelief, in its genus, is a mortal sin, yet a sudden movement of unbelief