Reply Obj. 2:  The higher reason is said to consent, from the very fact that it fails to direct the human act according to the Divine law, whether or not it advert to the eternal law.  For if it thinks of God’s law, it holds it in actual contempt:  and if not, it neglects it by a kind of omission.  Therefore the consent to a sinful act always proceeds from the higher reason:  because, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12), “the mind cannot effectively decide on the commission of a sin, unless by its consent, whereby it wields its sovereign power of moving the members to action, or of restraining them from action, it become the servant or slave of the evil deed.”

Reply Obj. 3:  The higher reason, by considering the eternal law, can direct or restrain the internal delectation, even as it can direct or restrain the external action:  nevertheless, before the judgment of the higher reason is pronounced the lower reason, while deliberating the matter in reference to temporal principles, sometimes approves of this delectation:  and then the consent to the delectation belongs to the lower reason.  If, however, after considering the eternal law, man persists in giving the same consent, such consent will then belong to the higher reason.

Reply Obj. 4:  The apprehension of the power of imagination is sudden and indeliberate:  wherefore it can cause an act before the higher or lower reason has time to deliberate.  But the judgment of the lower reason is deliberate, and so requires time, during which the higher reason can also deliberate; consequently, if by its deliberation it does not check the sinful act, this will deservedly be imputed to it. ________________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 8]

Whether Consent to Delectation Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1:  It would seem that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, for consent to delectation belongs to the lower reason, which does not consider the eternal types, i.e. the eternal law, and consequently does not turn away from them.  Now every mortal sin consists in turning away from the Divine law, as is evident from Augustine’s definition of mortal sin, which was quoted above (Q. 71, A. 6).  Therefore consent to delectation is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 2:  Further, consent to a thing is not evil, unless the thing to which consent is given be evil.  Now “the cause of anything being such is yet more so,” or at any rate not less.  Consequently the thing to which a man consents cannot be a lesser evil than his consent.  But delectation without deed is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin.  Therefore neither is the consent to the delectation a mortal sin.

Obj. 3:  Further, delectations differ in goodness and malice, according to the difference of the deeds, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 3, 5).  Now the inward thought is one thing, and the outward deed, e.g. fornication, is another.  Therefore the delectation consequent to the act of inward thought, differs in goodness and malice from the pleasure of fornication, as much as the inward thought differs from the outward deed; and consequently there is a like difference of consent on either hand.  But the inward thought is not a mortal sin, nor is the consent to that thought:  and therefore neither is the consent to the delectation.