I answer that, As stated (A. 5), sin may be in the reason, not only in respect of reason’s proper act, but sometimes in respect of its directing human actions.  Now it is evident that reason directs not only external acts, but also internal passions.  Consequently when the reason fails in directing the internal passions, sin is said to be in the reason, as also when it fails in directing external actions.  Now it fails, in two ways, in directing internal passions:  first, when it commands unlawful passions; for instance, when a man deliberately provokes himself to a movement of anger, or of lust:  secondly, when it fails to check the unlawful movement of a passion; for instance, when a man, having deliberately considered that a rising movement of passion is inordinate, continues, notwithstanding, to dwell (immoratur) upon it, and fails to drive it away.  And in this sense the sin of morose delectation is said to be in the reason.

Reply Obj. 1:  Delectation is indeed in the appetitive power as its proximate principle; but it is in the reason as its first mover, in accordance with what has been stated above (A. 1), viz. that actions which do not pass into external matter are subjected in their principles.

Reply Obj. 2:  Reason has its proper elicited act about its proper object; but it exercises the direction of all the objects of those lower powers that can be directed by the reason:  and accordingly delectation about sensible objects comes also under the direction of reason.

Reply Obj. 3:  Delectation is said to be morose not from a delay of time, but because the reason in deliberating dwells (immoratur) thereon, and fails to drive it away, “deliberately holding and turning over what should have been cast aside as soon as it touched the mind,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12). ________________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 7]

Whether the Sin of Consent to the Act Is in the Higher Reason?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason.  For consent is an act of the appetitive power, as stated above (Q. 15, A. 1):  whereas the reason is an apprehensive power.  Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason.

Obj. 2:  Further, “the higher reason is intent on contemplating and consulting the eternal law,” as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 7). [*_Rationes aeternae,_ cf.  I, Q. 15, AA. 2, 3, where as in similar passages ratio has been rendered by the English type, because St. Thomas was speaking of the Divine idea as the archetype of the creature.  Hence the type or idea is a rule of conduct, and is identified with the eternal law, (cf.  A. 8, Obj. 1; A. 9)].  But sometimes consent is given to an act, without consulting the eternal law:  since man does not always think about Divine things, whenever he consents to an act.  Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not always in the higher reason.