Reply Obj. 1:  This argument considers the defect in the proper act of the reason in respect of its proper object, and with regard to the case when it is a defect of knowledge about something which one is unable to know:  for then this defect of reason is not a sin, and excuses from sin, as is evident with regard to the actions of madmen.  If, however, the defect of reason be about something which a man is able and ought to know, he is not altogether excused from sin, and the defect is imputed to him as a sin.  The defect which belongs only to the act of directing the other powers, is always imputed to reason as a sin, because it can always obviate this defect by means of its proper act.

Reply Obj. 2:  As stated above (Q. 17, A. 1), when we were treating of the acts of the will and reason, the will moves and precedes the reason, in one way, and the reason moves and precedes the will in another:  so that both the movement of the will can be called rational, and the act of the reason, voluntary.  Accordingly sin is found in the reason, either through being a voluntary defect of the reason, or through the reason being the principle of the will’s act.

The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said (ad 1). ________________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 6]

Whether the Sin of Morose Delectation Is in the Reason?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the sin of morose delectation is not in the reason.  For delectation denotes a movement of the appetitive power, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 1).  But the appetitive power is distinct from the reason, which is an apprehensive power.  Therefore morose delectation is not in the reason.

Obj. 2:  Further, the object shows to which power an act belongs, since it is through the act that the power is directed to its object.  Now a morose delectation is sometimes about sensible goods, and not about the goods of the reason.  Therefore the sin of morose delectation is not in the reason.

Obj. 3:  Further, a thing is said to be morose [From the Latin _mora_—­delay] through taking a length of time.  But length of time is no reason why an act should belong to a particular power.  Therefore morose delectation does not belong to the reason.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that “if the consent to a sensual delectation goes no further than the mere thought of the pleasure, I deem this to be like as though the woman alone had partaken of the forbidden fruit.”  Now “the woman” denotes the lower reason, as he himself explains (De Trin. xii, 12).  Therefore the sin of morose delectation is in the reason.