Reply Obj. 2:  God does not respect persons in punishing the great more severely, because their excellence conduces to the gravity of their sin, as stated.

Reply Obj. 3:  The man who excels in anything reaps disadvantage, not from the good which he has, but from his abuse thereof. ________________________

QUESTION 74

OF THE SUBJECT OF SIN
(In Ten Articles)

We must now consider the subject of vice or sin:  under which head there are ten points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether the will can be the subject of sin?

(2) Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?

(3) Whether the sensuality can be the subject of sin?

(4) Whether it can be the subject of mortal sin?

(5) Whether the reason can be the subject of sin?

(6) Whether morose delectation or non-morose delectation be subjected in the higher reason?

(7) Whether the sin of consent in the act of sin is subjected in the higher reason?

(8) Whether the lower reason can be the subject of mortal sin?

(9) Whether the higher reason can be the subject of venial sin?

(10) Whether there can be in the higher reason a venial sin directed to its proper object? ________________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 1]

Whether the Will Is a Subject of Sin?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the will cannot be a subject of sin.  For Dionysius says (Div.  Nom. iv) that “evil is outside the will and the intention.”  But sin has the character of evil.  Therefore sin cannot be in the will.

Obj. 2:  Further, the will is directed either to the good or to what seems good.  Now from the fact that will wishes the good, it does not sin:  and that it wishes what seems good but is not truly good, points to a defect in the apprehensive power rather than in the will.  Therefore sin is nowise in the will.

Obj. 3:  Further, the same thing cannot be both subject and efficient cause of sin:  because “the efficient and the material cause do not coincide” (Phys. 2, text. 70).  Now the will is the efficient cause of sin:  because the first cause of sinning is the will, as Augustine states (De Duabus Anim. x, 10, 11).  Therefore it is not the subject of sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that “it is by the will that we sin, and live righteously.”

I answer that, Sin is an act, as stated above (Q. 71, AA. 1, 6).  Now some acts pass into external matter, e.g. to cut and to burn:  and such acts have for their matter and subject, the thing into which the action passes:  thus the Philosopher states (Phys. iii, text. 18) that “movement is the act of the thing moved, caused by a mover.”  On the other hand, there are acts which do not pass into external matter, but remain in the agent, e.g. to desire and to know:  and such