EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 8]

Whether Sin Is Aggravated by Reason of Its Causing More Harm?

Objection 1:  It would seem that a sin is not aggravated by reason of its causing more harm.  Because the harm done is an issue consequent to the sinful act.  But the issue of an act does not add to its goodness or malice, as stated above (Q. 20, A. 5).  Therefore a sin is not aggravated on account of its causing more harm.

Obj. 2:  Further, harm is inflicted by sins against our neighbor.  Because no one wishes to harm himself:  and no one can harm God, according to Job 35:6, 8:  “If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him? . . .  Thy wickedness may hurt a man that is like thee.”  If, therefore, sins were aggravated through causing more harm, it would follow that sins against our neighbor are more grievous than sins against God or oneself.

Obj. 3:  Further, greater harm is inflicted on a man by depriving him of the life of grace, than by taking away his natural life; because the life of grace is better than the life of nature, so far that man ought to despise his natural life lest he lose the life of grace.  Now, speaking absolutely, a man who leads a woman to commit fornication deprives her of the life of grace by leading her into mortal sin.  If therefore a sin were more grievous on account of its causing a greater harm, it would follow that fornication, absolutely speaking, is a more grievous sin than murder, which is evidently untrue.  Therefore a sin is not more grievous on account of its causing a greater harm.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib.  Arb. iii, 14):  “Since vice is contrary to nature, a vice is the more grievous according as it diminishes the integrity of nature.”  Now the diminution of the integrity of nature is a harm.  Therefore a sin is graver according as it does more harm.

I answer that, Harm may bear a threefold relation to sin.  Because sometimes the harm resulting from a sin is foreseen and intended, as when a man does something with a mind to harm another, e.g. a murderer or a thief.  In this case the quantity of harm aggravates the sin directly, because then the harm is the direct object of the sin.  Sometimes the harm is foreseen, but not intended; for instance, when a man takes a short cut through a field, the result being that he knowingly injures the growing crops, although his intention is not to do this harm, but to commit fornication.  In this case again the quantity of the harm done aggravates the sin; indirectly, however, in so far, to wit, as it is owing to his will being strongly inclined to sin, that a man does not forbear from doing, to himself or to another, a harm which he would not wish simply.  Sometimes, however, the harm is neither foreseen nor intended:  and then if this harm is connected with the sin accidentally, it does not aggravate the sin directly; but, on account of his neglecting to