Reply Obj. 3:  The love of God is unitive, in as much as it draws man’s affections from the many to the one; so that the virtues, which flow from the love of God, are connected together.  But self-love disunites man’s affections among different things, in so far as man loves himself, by desiring for himself temporal goods, which are various and of many kinds:  hence vices and sins, which arise from self-love, are not connected together. ________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 2]

Whether All Sins Are Equal?

Objection 1:  It would seem that all sins are equal.  Because sin is to do what is unlawful.  Now to do what is unlawful is reproved in one and the same way in all things.  Therefore sin is reproved in one and the same way.  Therefore one sin is not graver than another.

Obj. 2:  Further, every sin is a transgression of the rule of reason, which is to human acts what a linear rule is in corporeal things.  Therefore to sin is the same as to pass over a line.  But passing over a line occurs equally and in the same way, even if one go a long way from it or stay near it, since privations do not admit of more or less.  Therefore all sins are equal.

Obj. 3:  Further, sins are opposed to virtues.  But all virtues are equal, as Cicero states (Paradox. iii).  Therefore all sins are equal.

On the contrary, Our Lord said to Pilate (John 19:11):  “He that hath delivered me to thee, hath the greater sin,” and yet it is evident that Pilate was guilty of some sin.  Therefore one sin is greater than another.

I answer that, The opinion of the Stoics, which Cicero adopts in the book on Paradoxes (Paradox. iii), was that all sins are equal:  from which opinion arose the error of certain heretics, who not only hold all sins to be equal, but also maintain that all the pains of hell are equal.  So far as can be gathered from the words of Cicero the Stoics arrived at their conclusion through looking at sin on the side of the privation only, in so far, to wit, as it is a departure from reason; wherefore considering simply that no privation admits of more or less, they held that all sins are equal.  Yet, if we consider the matter carefully, we shall see that there are two kinds of privation.  For there is a simple and pure privation, which consists, so to speak, in being corrupted; thus death is privation of life, and darkness is privation of light.  Such like privations do not admit of more or less, because nothing remains of the opposite habit; hence a man is not less dead on the first day after his death, or on the third or fourth days, than after a year, when his corpse is already dissolved; and, in like manner, a house is no darker if the light be covered with several shades, than if it were covered by a single shade shutting out all the light.  There is, however, another privation which is not simple, but retains something of the opposite habit; it consists in becoming