Reply Obj. 2:  Objects, in relation to external acts, have the character of matter “about which”; but, in relation to the interior act of the will, they have the character of end; and it is owing to this that they give the act its species.  Nevertheless, even considered as the matter “about which,” they have the character of term, from which movement takes its species (Phys. v, text. 4; Ethic. x, 4); yet even terms of movement specify movements, in so far as term has the character of end.

Reply Obj. 3:  These distinctions of sins are given, not as distinct species of sins, but to show their various causes. ________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 4]

Whether Sin Is Fittingly Divided into Sin Against God, Against
Oneself, and Against One’s Neighbor?

Objection 1:  It would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin against God, against one’s neighbor, and against oneself.  For that which is common to all sins should not be reckoned as a part in the division of sin.  But it is common to all sins to be against God:  for it is stated in the definition of sin that it is “against God’s law,” as stated above (Q. 66, A. 6).  Therefore sin against God should not be reckoned a part of the division of sin.

Obj. 2:  Further, every division should consist of things in opposition to one another.  But these three kinds of sin are not opposed to one another:  for whoever sins against his neighbor, sins against himself and against God.  Therefore sin is not fittingly divided into these three.

Obj. 3:  Further, specification is not taken from things external.  But God and our neighbor are external to us.  Therefore sins are not distinguished specifically with regard to them:  and consequently sin is unfittingly divided according to these three.

On the contrary, Isidore (De Summo Bono), in giving the division of sins, says that “man is said to sin against himself, against God, and against his neighbor.”

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 71, AA. 1, 6), sin is an inordinate act.  Now there should be a threefold order in man:  one in relation to the rule of reason, in so far as all our actions and passions should be commensurate with the rule of reason:  another order is in relation to the rule of the Divine Law, whereby man should be directed in all things:  and if man were by nature a solitary animal, this twofold order would suffice.  But since man is naturally a civic and social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2, hence a third order is necessary, whereby man is directed in relation to other men among whom he has to dwell.  Of these orders the second contains the first and surpasses it.  For whatever things are comprised under the order of reason, are comprised under the order of God Himself.  Yet some things are comprised under the order of God, which surpass the human reason, such as matters of faith, and things due to God alone.