Obj. 4:  Several of the things mentioned among the gifts, are virtues:  for, as stated above (Q. 57, A. 2), wisdom, understanding, and knowledge are intellectual virtues, counsel pertains to prudence, piety to a kind of justice, and fortitude is a moral virtue.  Therefore it seems that the gifts do not differ from the virtues.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. i, 12) distinguishes seven gifts, which he states to be denoted by the seven sons of Job, from the three theological virtues, which, he says, are signified by Job’s three daughters.  He also distinguishes (Moral. ii, 26) the same seven gifts from the four cardinal virtues, which he says were signified by the four corners of the house.

I answer that, If we speak of gift and virtue with regard to the notion conveyed by the words themselves, there is no opposition between them.  Because the word “virtue” conveys the notion that it perfects man in relation to well-doing, while the word “gift” refers to the cause from which it proceeds.  Now there is no reason why that which proceeds from one as a gift should not perfect another in well-doing:  especially as we have already stated (Q. 63, A. 3) that some virtues are infused into us by God.  Wherefore in this respect we cannot differentiate gifts from virtues.  Consequently some have held that the gifts are not to be distinguished from the virtues.  But there remains no less a difficulty for them to solve; for they must explain why some virtues are called gifts and some not; and why among the gifts there are some, fear, for instance, that are not reckoned virtues.

Hence it is that others have said that the gifts should be held as being distinct from the virtues; yet they have not assigned a suitable reason for this distinction, a reason, to wit, which would apply either to all the virtues, and to none of the gifts, or vice versa.  For, seeing that of the seven gifts, four belong to the reason, viz. wisdom, knowledge, understanding and counsel, and three to the appetite, viz. fortitude, piety and fear; they held that the gifts perfect the free-will according as it is a faculty of the reason, while the virtues perfect it as a faculty of the will:  since they observed only two virtues in the reason or intellect, viz. faith and prudence, the others being in the appetitive power or the affections.  If this distinction were true, all the virtues would have to be in the appetite, and all the gifts in the reason.

Others observing that Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that “the gift of the Holy Ghost, by coming into the soul endows it with prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude, and at the same time strengthens it against every kind of temptation by His sevenfold gift,” said that the virtues are given us that we may do good works, and the gifts, that we may resist temptation.  But neither is this distinction sufficient.  Because the virtues also resist those temptations which lead to the sins that are contrary to the virtues; for everything naturally resists its contrary:  which is especially clear with regard to charity, of which it is written (Cant. 8:7):  “Many waters cannot quench charity.”